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Note
Judge Nullification:
A Perception of Unpublished Opinions
RAFI MOGHADAM*

Back in 1974, the CaliforniaSupreme Court took the ground-breakingstep of creating
an appellate rule that barred citation to unpublished opinions. The "no-citation rule"
was designed to facilitate legal research by limiting the universe of citable cases. Over
time, however, the rule has proven to be a mechanism for questionable discrimination
against unpublished decisions. Unpublished appellate opinions are restricted
supposedly based on characteristics shared by them-chiefly, unoriginal contentwhen in fact these cases often exhibit vibrant legal discourse. This Note reviews the nocitation rule from the ground up. The analysis begins with a comprehensive
background, proceeds to test the legal basis for the no-citation rule, challenges
misconceptions about the utility of unpublished decisions, and discusses changes in the
circumstances upon which the no-citation rule was founded. Segregation of cases based
on publicationstatus, the analysis shows, is an unconstitutionalpractice thatpotentially
casts the judiciary in bad light. The practice is at odds with the state's judicial notice
statute and the judiciary's ethical obligation to maintain an appearance of fairness.
Bringing an end to the no-citation rule, which enables discrimination against
unpublished opinions, thus, is legally justified and ethically required.

* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2011. I thank
Professors Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. and Susan Nevelow Mart for their invaluable guidance, and my
industrious colleagues at the Hastings Law Journalfor their terrific feedback in the production of this
Note.
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INTRODUCTION
In California, not all court opinions are created equal. Some are
published, but most are censored.' By rules of court, appellate courts'
decide for themselves whether their opinions should be published or
carry precedential force.3 Through one such rule, dubbed the "no-citation
rule," citation to unpublished opinions is prohibited.! An unpublished
opinion, under this strict rule, is effectively treated as nonexistent, as it
may neither be cited nor relied upon in subsequent cases. By the stroke
of a pen, a court can make its opinion uncitable, limiting the scope of its
reach.' This ability to constrain opinions reduces accountability for
decisions by discouraging supreme court review. As a result, the
appellate publication process lends itself to a perception of secrecy,
evasion, and injustice.
The California Supreme Court typically intervenes to resolve splits
among courts, to address important issues, or to correct far-reaching
errors.6 Unpublished decisions in this system are less likely to get the
supreme court's attention. Because it cannot be cited in subsequent
cases,7 an unpublished opinion will not have far-reaching effect, cause
splits in authority, or advance important problems. The unpublished
decision becomes imprisoned to a single case. The supreme court, in
turn, faces less pressure to intervene. An intermediate court bent on
reaching a particular outcome, or one unsure of the correctness of its
analysis, can exploit the no-citation rule to discourage supreme court
review. The mechanism for rendering opinions uncitable, which is
loosely regulated, is dangerous, because it enables intermediate courts to
commit error with impunity.
Developed in 1974,' the no-citation rule came almost a century after
California voters disapproved the supreme court's practice of issuing
opinionless judgments.o The supreme court defended opinionless
judgments in the 18oos-much as it defends the no-citation rule today-

I. See CAL. R. Cr. 8.Iioo-8.1I25 (publication rules); see also JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., 2010
COURT STATISTICS REPORT, STATEWIDE CASELOAD TRENDS: 1999-2000 THROUGH 2008-2oo9, at 29 (2010).
2. All further court references are to California state courts unless otherwise noted.
3. CAL.R.Cr.8.11o5,8.1115.
4. Id. R. 8.1115(a).
5. See id. (proscribing citation to unpublished opinions).
6. Id. R. 8.500(b).
7. Id. R. 8.-I15 (a).

8. See id. R. 8.nio5(c) (stating which standards "should" be used in deciding whether to publish
opinions).

9. See Gray v. Kay, 120 Cal. Rptr. 915, 918 (Ct. App.
rule in 1974).
lo. People v. Kelly, 146 P.3d 547, 550, 552 (Cal. 2006).

1975)

(noting adoption of the no-citation
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as a necessary means of managing its docket and preventing waste." The
voters rejected this argument, refusing to place efficiency before
accountability." They compelled the court to provide written opinions
and responded to its backlog by hiring more judges.13 Deprived of its
ability to produce opinionless judgments, the supreme court passed a
rule that today forces attorneys and judges to treat some cases as if they
were opinionless. 4 This rule of make-believe is the no-citation rule."
From a legal standpoint, the no-citation rule is unconstitutional as
inconsistent with the state's judicial notice statute.6 A fundamental
constitutional restraint on rules of court is, and always has been, that
rules of court must be consistent with statutes. 7 The no-citation rule
prohibits an act that judicial notice permits: citation to unpublished court
records." In this battle between the no-citation rule and judicial notice,
the statute overrides the rule. Inconsistency between the no-citation rule
and the judicial notice statute is fatal to the former."
As a practical matter, the no-citation rule unjustifiably jeopardizes
public confidence in the judiciary's integrity. An order not to publish an
opinion can be seen as an attempt to nullify the law in a given case in
order to force a certain outcome. Even an innocent refusal to publish an
opinion might be read as judicial indiscretion. Additionally, the advent of
the Internet rendered obsolete the equitable premise of appellate
censorship, which was to prevent exploitation of hard-to-find
unpublished decisions.o Before the Internet, explorers with deeper
pockets returned better search results." But today, every opinion is a

ii. See Houston v. Williams, 13 Cal. 24, 26 (1859) (explaining the inefficiency and burdens
avoided by opinionless judgments), supersededby constitutionalamendment, CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 14.
12. See Kelly, 146 P.3d at 552 (noting a debate at the Constitutional Convention in which
supporters argued written opinions would tend to promote honesty and accountability).
13. Id. at 553.
14. CAL. R. Cr. 8.iI5(a).
15. See id.

I6. The term "judicial notice statute" as used here refers collectively to sections 450 through 460
of the California Evidence Code. See CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 450-460 (West 2004). All further statutory
references are to California authorities unless otherwise noted.
17. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6(d); People v. McClellan, 31 Cal. io1, 103 (1866); Brooks v. Union
Trust & Realty Co., 79 P. 843 (Cal. 19o5).
i8. Compare CAL. EVID. CODE § 452(d) (permitting judicial notice to any court record), with CAL.
R. Cr. 8.1115 (barring citation to unpublished opinions).
19. See authorities cited supra note I7.
20. People v. Valenzuela, 150 Cal. Rptr. 314, 322 (Ct. App. 1978) (Jefferson (Bernard), J.,
dissenting) (explaining the fairness argument for the no-citation rule).
21. See id. ("Permitting the citation of unpublished opinions would create fundamental problems
of unfairness between parties and their counsel who possess unlimited funds for research and those
with very limited budgets."); APPELLATE COURT COMM., JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING PROPOSED RULE TO PROHIBIT THE CITATION OF UNPUBLISHED APPELLATE
OPINIONs 15 (Staff Draft 1973) [hereinafter JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT] (relaying a complaint

concerning unfair use of hard-to-find unpublished cases).
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Boolean or Google search away." Now, uncovering an unpublished
decision is more a product of a competent query than a reciprocal of
wealth. Confronted with this new reality, courts permit citation to
unpublished opinions from other jurisdictions, while prohibiting
reference to their own unpublished decisions. This double standard
further undermines the equity argument for censorship.23
The constitutionality of the no-citation rule has never been tested
against the judicial notice statute, nor has the rule been challenged as
frustrating the intent behind the ban on opinionless judgments. These
challenges are ripe for pressing. At some point, every lawyer has the
unpleasant experience of finding the perfect case on an issue, only to
learn the opinion is unpublished.24 In those instances, counsel may wish
to request judicial notice of the unpublished authority, or to cite it
directly and raise the constitutional arguments presented here. Similarly,
if counsel loses an appeal in an unpublished opinion, challenging the
constitutionality of the no-citation rule may be a prudent means of
increasing the likelihood of supreme court review.
While the no-citation rule remains in force, every appeal in
California is subject to its whim. This Note examines the history and
evolution of California's publication system and analyzes the role of the
no-citation rule within that system. The discussion identifies flaws in the
premise behind the no-citation rule, explains the rule's unconstitutionality,
and considers threats posed by it to the rule of law.

I.

THE EVOLUTION OF APPELLATE PUBLICATION RULES

Restrictions on citation of appellate decisions are a product of the
latter part of the Twentieth Century. Understanding the background to
these restrictions is helpful to evaluating the premise for their continued
existence, and is the focus of this Part.

22. See Stephen R. Barnett, Deflating: The California Supreme Court's Wonderful Law-Making
Machine Begins to Self-Destruct, 45 HASTINGs L.J. 520, 549-50 (1994) [hereinafter Barnett, Deflating]
(observing that modem legal research is computer-based); Stephen R. Barnett, The Dog That Did Not
Bark: No-Citation Rules, Judicial Conference Rulemaking, and Federal Public Defenders, 62 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1491, 1503-04 (2oo5) [hereinafter Barnett, Bark] (reporting on a study that suggests
citability of unpublished opinions has insignificant adverse consequences).
23. See Harris v. Investor's Bus. Daily, Inc., 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d io8, I12 (Ct. App. 2oo6) (allowing
citation to unreported federal opinions); Lebrilla v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 25, 31-32 (Ct.
App. 2004) (permitting citation to unpublished decisions of other states); Brown v. Franchise Tax Bd.,
242 Cal. Rptr. Slo, 813 n.6 (Ct. App. 1987) ("Unpublished decisions by the courts of other jurisdictions
may be cited and considered for their persuasive value."); see also Hart v. Massanari, 266 F. 3d 1155,
1170 (9th Cir. 2001) ("It is not unusual to cite the decision of courts in foreign jurisdictions, so long as
they speak to a matter relevant to the issue before us."); Styne v. Stevens, 26 P.3d 343, 351 n.4 (Cal.
2oo6) (relying on an unpublished administrative decision).
24. See, e.g., Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899 (8th Cir.) (identifying an unpublished
opinion as the only authority on point), vacated as moot on reh'g en banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir.
2000).
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SELECTIVE PUBLICATION

Since the early days of statehood, and for decades thereafter,
California kept its supreme court out of the publication business.
California's founding constitution of 1849 directed the legislature to
publish all laws and whatever court decisions it deemed expedient." "The
legislature shall provide for the speedy publication of all statute laws, and
of such judicial decisions as it may deem expedient; and all laws and
judicial decisions shall be free for publication by any person."26 Deciding
which court opinions to publish was the prerogative of the legislature,
not the supreme court." This prerogative outlived the 1849 Constitution,
which was replaced in 1879.8 Under the 1879 Constitution, the legislature
retained the duty to "provide for the speedy publication of such opinions
of the Supreme Court as it ... deem[ed] expedient," all of which had to
remain free of charge for private publication." As before, discretion for
choosing which opinions to publish at public expense fell into the
legislature's lap."o The supreme court was kept out of the loop.
A constitutional amendment in 1904 changed the process,
transferring control over publication to the supreme court.3 Now, the
supreme court chooses the decisions, and the legislature publishes them."
Essentially, the supreme court undertook what the legislature had been
doing for decades. This role reversal was fairly uneventful until the
supreme court endowed itself with a right of censorship in 1974." Then,
the supreme court adopted a rule, initially numbered Rule 977 and later
renumbered Rule 8.III5(a), stating, "[A]n opinion of a California Court
of Appeal or superior court appellate division that is not certified for
publication or ordered published must not be cited or relied on by a
court or a party in any other action."3 4
With this and other specially crafted rules, the supreme court
enforces its selective publication authority. The rules identify opinions

for publication and bar citation to all other opinions." Rephrased,
unselected opinions are censored."

25. CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. VI,

§

12.

26. Id.
27.

Id.

28. See CAL. CONST. of I879, art. VI,
29. Id.
30. Id.
31.

See

§ 16.

CAL. SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR PUEL'N OF COURT OF APPEAL

OrS.,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 9 (2oo6) [hereinafter COMMITrEE REPORT] (describing the history of

appellate publication rules).
32. CAL. CONST. art. VI,

33.
34.
35.
36.

§ 14.

Gray v. Kay, 120 Cal. Rptr. 915,918 (Ct. App. 1975).
See CAL. R. Cr. 8.1115 (prohibiting citation to unpublished decisions).
See id. R. 8. oo-8.h1125 (publication rules).
Id. R. 8.1o5.
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WRITTEN OPINION REQUIREMENT

The constitutional provision relating to court opinions contains
another imperative, requiring "[d]ecisions of the Supreme Court and
courts of appeal that determine causes [to] be in writing with reasons
stated."" One might think this law merely codifies a natural judicial
function, making it as unnecessary as legislating that people must breathe
air. Demanding courts put pen to paper, however, follows an insightful
history of resistance."
The 1849 Constitution established a three-member supreme court
with appellate jurisdiction over a variety of cases, but imposed no duty
on the court to provide reasons for its decisions.39 Amendments to the
constitution in 1862 expanded the court's membership to five justices and
described a wider range of cases in which the court had appellate
jurisdiction.o "There was no provision in either the original 1849
Constitution or the amendments of 1862 for intermediate courts of
appeal-all appeals... went directly to the Supreme Court."4 ' As
amended, the constitution also left unchanged the regulation of court
opinions.42 The supreme court remained free to render opinionless
judgments.
In 1854, the legislature tried to compel the supreme court to provide
written reasons for its decisions, but was met with reproach. 43 The
legislature enacted a statute requiring "[a]ll decisions given upon an
appeal in any appella[te] Court of th[e] State, shall be given in writing,
with the reason therefor, and filed with the Clerk of the Court."" In
Houston v. Williams, the supreme court responded by invalidating the
statute. 45 The court held that the legislature was without authority to
require the judicial branch to provide written reasons for its decisions.46
"The Legislature can no more require this Court to state the reasons of
its decisions, than this Court can require, for the validity of the statutes,
that the Legislature shall accompany them with the reasons for their
enactment."47 The court explained,
The principles of law settled, are to be extracted from the records of
the cases in which the decisions are rendered. The reports are full of

37. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 14.
38. See People v. Kelly, 146 P.3d 547, 550 (Cal. 2oo6) (examining the history of article VI, section
14, to decide whether written explanations are necessary in Wende appeals).
39. CAL. CONST. Of 1849, art. VI, §§ 1, 2,4.
40. Kelly, 146 P-3 d at 550.
41. Id. at 55-51.

of 1849, art. VI, § 12 (amended 1862).
43. Kelly, 146 P.3d at 550.
42. CAL. CONST.

44. Id. (quoting 1854 Cal. Stat. 72).

45. 13 Cal. 24, 25 (1859), superseded by constitutionalamendment, CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 14.
46. Id.
47. Id.

14o4
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adjudged cases, in which opinions were never delivered. The facts are
stated by the Reporter, with the points arising thereon, and are
followed by the judgments rendered, and yet no one ever doubted that
the Courts, in the instances mentioned, were discharging their entire
constitutional obligations.
As the supreme court's workload multiplied, so did the problem of
unwritten opinions. Judgments were handed down without explanation,
causing confusion, both as to what was to be done on remand and when
cited as precedent in subsequent cases.49 During the four years preceding
the state's second Constitutional Convention in 1878, the court had
elected not to provide a written opinion in nearly one-quarter of the
more than 2200 cases it decided."o Delegates to the Constitutional
Convention complained that the practice of deciding a case without a
written opinion prevented lawyers from fully understanding the court's
view on a case."' Multiple issues may arise on any given appeal, delegate
Samuel Wilson suggested, but a judgment without comment would not
say which argument carried the day." Without "light from above,"
Wilson reasoned, cases could find themselves back in the supreme court
on the same issue.53
To remedy the compounding problem of unwritten decisions, the
delegates of the Constitutional Convention of 1878 resolved to compel
the supreme court to submit written reasons for its judgments.54 The
delegates proposed a constitutional mandate, mimicking the statute
invalidated in Houston v. Williams." A countervailing concern was
burdening an already overwhelmed supreme court."' Being forced to
write opinions would consume judicial time, further backlogging the
court's docket." But the delegates thought the increased burden was
limited, as opinions could be succinct,'8 and was dwarfed by the
compelling need for clarity, consistency, and accountability. Requiring
the court to justify its judgments with written opinions promoted "purity

48. Id.

49. See Kelly, 146 P-3 d at 550-51 (citing 2 E.B. WILLIS & P.K. STocKroN, DEBATES AND
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 950 (i88s)) (discussing
concerns of delegates to the Constitutional Convention).
50. Kelly, 146 P.3d at 550 (citing 2 WILLIS & STOCKTON, supra note 49).
51. Id. at 551-52 (citing 2 WILLIS & STOCKTON, supra note 49).
52. Id. at 551 (citing 2 WILLIS & STOCKTON, supra note 49).
53. Id. (quoting delegate Samuel Wilson) (citing 2 WILLIS & STOCKTON, supra note 49).

54. Id.
55. Id. at 552.

56. Id.
57. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1177 (9th Cir. 2001) (describing opinion writing as an
"exacting and extremely time-consuming task").
58. See, e.g., Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131 (1845).
59. See Kelly, 146 P. 3 d at 551-52 (quoting delegates Samuel Wilson and Clitus Barbour) (citing 2
WILLIS & STOCKTON, supra note 49, at 951, 1331-33, 1447-48, 1454-57, 1499).
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and honesty in the administration of justice." 8 Expanding the supreme
court's membership addressed the inferior concern for delay.6
Labeled article VI, section 2, the proposed constitutional changes
were ratified by the electorate in 1879.6' The new constitution created
two departments within the supreme court and directed that "[i]n the
determination of causes, all decisions of the Court in bank or in
departments shall be given in writing, and the grounds of the decision
shall be stated." 63 But the creation of departments was insufficient to
adequately relieve the supreme court's workload.
California's population skyrocketed,' and the court's backlog
continued to increase until 1903, when the legislature pro osed a
constitutional amendment to add intermediate courts of appeal. Voters
approved the amendment in 1904 without retreating from their demand
for written decisions.6 The amendment insisted that "[i]n the
determination of causes all decisions of the supreme court and of the
District Courts of Appeal shall be given in writing, and the grounds of
the decision shall be stated."6 Five years later, in 1909, the legislature
passed a statute requiring publication of all court decisions, regardless of
their designation by the supreme court." Unpublished decisions were
privately printed in a series entitled California Unreported Cases.6
Over the years, the state has increased the number of intermediate
appellate courts rather than compromise its demand for written
decisions.' When article VI was last repealed and reenacted in 1966, the
writing requirement was reaffirmed." Recast in section 14 of article VI,
the writing requirement now reads, "Decisions of the Supreme Court
and courts of appeal that determine causes shall be in writing with
reasons stated."72

60. Id. at 552 (citing

2 WILLIS & SToclerON, supra note 49, at 951) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. State of California Total Population, 1850 to 2010, CAL. DEP'T OF FINANCE,
http://www.dof.ca.gov/research/demographic/documents/Califomia-HistoricalPop-Seatsl85o-2olo.pdf
(last
visited May 23, 2011).
65. Kelly, 146 P-3d at 552-53 (noting the creation of three court of appeal districts).
66. Id. at 553.
67. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 24 (repealed 1966).
68. JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 21, at 9.
69. Id.
70. See CAL. CONsT. art. VI, § 14 (retaining the requirement of written decisions); CAL. Gov'T
CODE § 691oo (West 2009) (establishing six court of appeal districts).
71. See People v. Kelly, 146 P-3d 547, 553 (2oo6) (noting the repeal and reenactment of article
VI).
72. CAL. CONsT. art VI, § 14.

14o6
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The history of the written decision requirement suggests
institutional resistance from the courts. When instructed by statute to
give written explanation for decisions, the courts invalidated the statute
as unconstitutional, prompting the electorate to amend the constitution.73
Confronted with a constitutional mandate to give written decisions, the
courts reacted by narrowly interpreting their duty. 74 Background
materials prepared for the 1966 constitutional amendments explicitly
noted that "the written opinion requirement .. . has received a narrow
interpretation by the courts."7 ' Later, in 1974, the supreme court devised
a rule of pretense-the no-citation rule-that has the effect of making
opinions disappear. By prohibiting citation to or reliance on certain
decisions, the supreme court in effect asks the bench and bar to pretend
those decisions are opinionless.
The judiciary's reluctance towards written decisions seems at odds
with the will of the electorate, which has repeatedly affirmed and
expanded its demand that courts justify their decisions in writing. In
fact, appreciation for accountability has progressed so much that today
the holding in Houston v. Williams-which said the legislature lacks the
authority to demand explanation for court decisions-is unlikely to be
affirmed even without article VI, section 14. Since Houston, the
legislature has enacted several statutes requiring trial courts to provide
explanation for various rulings.75 For example, a trial court must provide
written justification whenever it awards child custody to a sex offender.
Written explanation is also required for rulings on motions for summary
judgment, on motions for ordinary judgment, and if requested, following
bench trials.s
Insofar as article VI, section 14 is inapplicable to trial courts,
Houston v. Williams, which has never been overruled, should control.'
Application of Houston v. Williams to trial court rulings would ostensibly
threaten section 3030 of the Family Code and sections 437c(g), 631.8, and

73. See Kelly, 146 P-3d at 550-51 (noting the reaction to Houston v. Williams).
74. Id. at 553 n.i (listing cases where the writing requirement was narrowly interpreted).
75. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting CAL. CONSTITUTION REVISION COMM'N, BACKGROUND
STUDY FOR CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMISSION ON ARTICLE VI pt. 3, at 4-5 (1964)).

76. See CAL. R. Cr. 8.1115 (prohibiting reliance on unpublished opinions).
77. See CAL. Cv. PROC. CODE § 437c(g) (West 2004) (requiring written explanation for orders
granting or denying motions for summary judgment); id. § 631.8 (requiring a statement of decision
upon granting a motion for judgment); id. § 632 (requiring a statement of decisions in court trials upon
request); CAL. FAM. CODE § 303o(a)(i) (West 2004) (demanding written explanation whenever the
court grants child custody to a sex offender or child abuser); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(i)(A)
(requiring written reasons for orders granting injunctions).
78. See Civ. PRoc. H§437c(g), 631.8, 632; FAM. § 303o(a)(i).
79. FAM. § 303o(a)(I).
8. Civ. PROC. §§ 437c(g), 635.8, 632.
81. See 13 Cal. 24, 25 (1859) (holding that the legislature may not demand explanations for court

decisions), superseded by constitutionalamendment, CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 14.

May 20II]

JUDGE NULLIFICATION

1407

632, of the Code of Civil Procedure." But no one seriously believes that
an appellate court today would invalidate these important provisions,
which have become ingrained in our legal system. Invalidating them on
account of judicial "dignity"8' likely would trigger backlash in the form of
public contempt and a constitutional amendment. The no-citation rule
represents resistance to the state's maturing trend towards increased
openness and accountability in the courts.
II. THE MECHANICS OF APPELLATE CENSORSHIP
Regulation of citation to court opinions is a process that relies on
multiple authorities, and delegates considerable discretion to intermediate
courts of appeal, to accomplish their effect. The mechanics of the
process, along with the premises advanced for it, are explored in this Part.
A.

EMBODIMENT IN CODIFIED LAW

Publication of California appellate opinions is governed by the rules
of court.8 Current rules are purportedly derived from article VI, section
14 of the constitution, which directs "[t]he Legislature [to] provide for
the prompt publication of such opinions of the Supreme Court and
courts of appeal as the Supreme Court deems appropriate.""' The

supreme court exercises this publication right by designating opinions to
be included in the Official Reports, which the legislature publishes at
public expense.8 Chapter eight of the rules of court sets forth the
supreme court's designations."' Under those rules, all opinions of the
supreme court are published in the Official Reports." Publication of
intermediate appellate opinions, by contrast, is discretionary.8
Each inferior appellate court decides for itself whether its opinion in
a particular case is certified for publication.' If only a portion of an
opinion is deemed worthy of publication, the opinion may be certified for
partial publication, limited to that portion.9' Interestingly, while fully
unpublished opinions may be accessed in their entirety through Westlaw

82. See supra text accompanying notes 77-80.
83. See id. (stating that no court with "dignity" could sanction a statutory demand for
explanations from the court).
84. CAL. R. Cr. 8.11oo-8.1t25.
85. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 14; see also CAL. R. Cr. 8. ioo (predicating publication rules on the
California Constitution).
86. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 68902 (West 2009) (commanding publication of the Official Reports).
87. See generally CAL. R. Cr. 8.11oo-8. 1125.
88. Id. R. 8.11o5(a).
89. See id. R. 8. Izo5(b) (setting forth the appellate courts' discretion to publish opinions).
g.

Id.

9'. Id. R. 8.11 i0.
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and Lexis, partially published opinions are redacted: Both Westlaw and
Lexis excise portions not marked for publication in such opinions.'
Any person may request publication of an unpublished case, or
depublication of a previously published opinion.' The requests must be
made in the form of a letter.' If the court of appeal denies a publication
request, the supreme court automatically reviews the denial.'
Depublication requests are made directly to the supreme court.
The citability of an opinion is tied to its publication. If an opinion is
not expressly certified for publication, it "must not be cited or relied on
by a court or a party in any other action,"' although limited exceptions
exist for res judicata, law of the case, and criminal proceedings involving
the same party.0 Restated, unpublished opinions are censored. Their
precedential value is severed by fiat, and they may neither be used nor
cited in any other case. This limitation is the direct result of the nocitation rule.
B.

RATIONALE FOR CENSORSHIP: ACCEss, EQUITY, AND CONVENIENCE

Restrictions on unpublished opinions ostensibly were borne out of
concern for fairness.' California's legal reporting system consists of two
series of books, the California Reporter and the California Appellate
Reports, which record the decisions of the supreme court and the
appellate courts, respectively. Collectively, these books serve as the
Official Reports of decisions.'" Only decisions certified for publication
appear in the Official Reports. Omitted decisions are left for unofficial
reporting, if at all, by private publishers.'o'
Before the digital era, this dichotomy of reporting created an
opportunity for exploitation." Skilled attorneys would not limit their

92. See, e.g., People v. Henry, 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 915, 917, 918 (Ct. App. 2oo9) (omitted portions);

People v. Grimes, 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 787, 788-89 (Ct. App. 2009) (same); In re J.M., 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 31,
33 (Ct. App. 2oo9) (same); Sanders v. Lawson, 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 851, 853, 855 (Ct. App. 2oo8) (same);
Martinelli v. Int'l House USA, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3 d 186, 188 (Ct. App. 2oo8) (same).
93. CAL. R. Cr. 8.iI2o(a) (publication requests), id. R. 8.s125(a) (depublication requests).
94. Id. R. 8.1 12o(a)(2),8.s125(a)(2).

95. Id. R. 8.112o(b).
96. Id. R. 8.1125(a).
97. Id. R. 8. 11 5(a)-

98. Id. R. 8.siI5 (b).
99. See People v. Valenzuela, 15o Cal. Rptr. 314, 322-23 (Ct. App. 1978) (Jefferson (Bernard), J.,
dissenting) (discussing the fairness grounds for the no-citation rule); JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT, supra
note 21, at 12, 15,36 (same).
Ioo. SUPREME COURT OF CAL., THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA: CONTAINING THE INTERNAL
OPERATING PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES OF THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT 4 (2007); THE BLUEBOOK: A
UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CIfATION 231 tbl.T.I (Columbia Law Review Ass'n et al. eds., 19th ed. 2010).
sos. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 21, at 9, 33 (describing private printing of
unpublished opinions).
1o2. See authorities cited supra note 99.
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legal research to the Official Reports. They would dig for gold in
unofficial reports. The most in-depth research was largely dependent on
finding, having access to, and having the time to comb through
voluminous unofficial reports." Researching unofficial reports, thus,
created a unique advantage for parties with greater resources.
Some in the legal community complained that selective publication
of cases "worked hardship upon attorneys and litigants in that
unpublished decisions, substantial in number, are continually cited as
authority under circumstances where opposing counsel have neither
heard of the case nor seen the written opinion. In practical effect, counsel
are 'sandbagged' by their use."" Advocates proposed either publishing
all appellate decisions in the Official Reports or barring citation to
unofficial opinions.' 5 The supreme court opted for the latter. Rule
8.iI15(a) prevents citation to or reliance on unpublished opinions,

whether by counsel or by the court.'O

III. PRIOR CHALLENGES TO NO-CITATION RULES
The no-citation rule has never been far from criticism." Indeed, it
has drawn a consistent history of criticism. The validity of restricting
unpublished opinions has been challenged in three notable cases, on
theories exclusive of judicial notice. The decisions in those cases provide
insight into the policies influencing regulation of unpublished opinions.
A.

PEOPLEV. VALENZUELA

Just four years after taking effect, the no-citation rule-then Rule
977-was declared invalid by the appellate department of the superior
court.' The appellate department in People v. Valenzuela voided Rule
977 and proceeded to consider one of its own unpublished opinions in
deciding the case before it." A substantial portion of the appellate
department's decision was devoted to rejecting the no-citation rule as
violating the basic concept of stare decisis, and as being inconsistent with
Civil Code section 22.2"o-a codification of the English common law.
The court of appeal transferred the case to itself, sua sponte,
without the request of either party."' The transfer vacated the appellate
103. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 21, at 15.
5o4. See id.

1oS. See id.
io6. CAL. R. Cr. 8.il]5(a).
107. See, e.g., JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 2z, at 21, 28-32 (recording opposition to the

proposed no-citation rule).
io8. People v. Valenzuela, 150 Cal. Rptr. 314, 320 (Ct. App. 1978) (Jefferson (Bernard), J.,
dissenting).
509. Id. at 320.

iio. Id. at 320-21.
iII. Id. at 320.
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department's decision -including its holding that Rule 977 was invalid by operation of law."' With Rule 977 resuscitated, the majority in the
higher court declined to comment on the issue. But the dissent took
exception. The gravity of the lower court's attack on the no-citation rule
evoked a response from Justice Jefferson."' He theorized that censorship
was tethered to the supreme court's publication right. Under this theory,
the no-citation rule was "an effective aid to the usefulness of [selective
publication]."" 4 Justice Jefferson also believed that the supreme court, as
the ultimate arbiter of case law, could attempt to control the
development of common law with devices like the no-citation rule
without offending stare decisis."'
As a matter of policy, Justice Jefferson dispatched the basic fairness
argument behind the no-citation rule."'6 At the time, the lack of
electronic databases made access to unpublished opinions a product of
chance rather than research, "since they [were] ... generally unavailable
to the bar."" Thus, absent the no-citation rule, an unfair opportunity for
exploitation arose for litigants with deep pockets for research."'

B.

SCHMIER V. CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT

Some of Justice Jefferson's arguments resurfaced in Schmier v.
CaliforniaSupreme Court,"' this time more directly. The Schmier court
adopted Justice Jefferson's dissent in People v. Valenzuela to save the
no-citation rule. 2 o The plaintiff in Schmier challenged the no-citation rule
as contrary to section 22.2 of the Civil Code and, therefore, violative of a
constitutional requirement that rules of court be consistent with
statutes.' 2 ' Section 22.2 codifies English common law, insofar as it is not
repugnant to or inconsistent with state or federal law."' Relying on the
"repugnancy" qualification of section 22.2, the court in Schmier held that
the no-citation rule itself, as a duly adopted California authority,"'
rendered inoperative any common law to the contrary. 2 4
112. Id. at 320-21.

113.
114.
115.
II6.

Id. at 321.
Id. at 322.
Id. at 323-24.
Id.

117. Id. at 322.

118. See id. at 322-24.
i19. See generally 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580 (Ct. App. 2ooo).
120. See id. at 584 (citing Valenzuela, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 322).
121. Id. at 582-83; see also CAL. CONsT. art. VI, § 6(d) (proscribing rules inconsistent with statute).
122. CAL. CIV. CODE §22.2 (West 2007).

123. Rules of court not transcending legislative enactments have the force of positive law.
Cantillon v. Superior Court, 309 P.2d 890, 892 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957); see also Silverbrand v. County of
Los Angeles, 205 P-3d 1047, 1o59 (Cal. 2009) (confirming that rules of court have the force of statute
to the extent that they are not inconsistent with statutes).
124. Schmier, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 584-85.
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Schmier also dismissed arguments against the no-citation rule based
on free speech, due process, and equal protection."' The thrust of
plaintiff's argument on those issues was that California's publication
rules create "a system of selective prospectivity that allows courts to
create a new rule of law applicable to a single case.",",6 Without denying
the evil of "selective prospectivity," the court responded that the rules
have enough safeguards to protect against it."' Like Justice Jefferson, the
Schmier court emphasized inconvenience to the judiciary of doing away
with the no-citation rule, despite its flaws."' The court highlighted the
time saved, for example, by summarily disposing of Wende appeals"' with
a few sentences in an unpublished opinion. 3 o Plaintiff's failure to
celebrate the efficiency of this process was criticized by the court. 3 '
Ironically, the Wende practice to which the court alluded was
disapproved by the supreme court six years later in People v. Kelly.'3 '
C.

ANASTASOFFV. UNITED STATES

Several months after Schmier was decided, an appellate panel held
that an analogous federal no-citation rule was unconstitutional.' In
Anastasoff v. United States, a taxpayer sought a refund from the IRS."
The IRS denied her claim as untimely.'35 The taxpayer relied on the
"Mailbox Rule" to sustain her claim.' ' There was a case directly on point
against the plaintiff, but it was unpublished. The taxpayer argued that the
unpublished opinion was not binding in her case.' The appellate panel
disagreed, holding that courts cannot artificially escape the precedential

125. Id. at 585-86.
126. See id. at 585.
127. Id. at 585-86.

128. See id. at 586-87 (stressing the waste and inefficiency of destroying the no-citation rule); see
also Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1177 (9th Cir. 2001) (expressing how unpublished opinions are
used to manage the court's docket).
129. "[A] Wende case is one in which appellate counsel in a criminal appeal advises the court that
no arguable appellate issues can be found, thereby invoking the obligation of the Court of Appeal to
conduct an independent review of the record." Schmier, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 586. Wende cases originate
from People v. Wende, 600 P.2d io7s (Cal. 1979).
130. Schmier, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 586-87.
131. Id.

132. People v. Kelly, 146 P-3d 547, 548-49, 558-59 (Cal. 2oo6) (disapproving cursory dispositions of
Wende appeals, and requiring, instead, a brief synopsis in every opinion deciding a Wende appeal,
describing contentions raised by the appellant, the underlying facts, procedural history, crime of which
defendant was convicted, and the punishment imposed).
133. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F-3 d 898, 899 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot on reh'g en
banc, 235 F-3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

1412

[Vol. 62:1I397

effect of prior decisions."' A court cannot declare the law in one case but
refuse to apply it in another. 9 To do so, held the court, would
unconstitutionally expand the power of the judiciary by allowing
disjointed application of the law. 4 o
A California court had similar thoughts earlier, in 1937, when it
ruled,
The fact that this case was not ordered reported in the official reports
of the Supreme Court does not detract from its binding force.... We
make this statement in view of appellants' contention that the
foregoing case is not binding because it does not appear in the official
reports of the Supreme Court."'
Anastasoff, thus, might fairly be viewed as a restatement of law.
Regardless, Anastasoff was subsequently vacated as moot when the
government caved in and paid the taxpayer's claim after she petitioned
for a rehearing en banc.'4 2
While overlooking judicial notice, Valenzuela, Schmier, and
Anastasoff do identify the competing interests affecting the no-citation
rule: efficiency versus accountability. 43 Against this backdrop, we turn to
the challenge posed by judicial notice to the no-citation rule.

IV.

RULE
Friction between a statute and a rule of court can spark a
constitutional controversy. When assessing the interaction between the
no-citation rule and the judicial notice statute, thus, relevant questions
include whether there is any friction between them, and if so, whether
that friction is necessary or tolerable. As elaborated below, the nocitation rule presents substantial resistance to the judicial notice statute,
and this resistance is unjustified, both as a matter of law and as a matter
of policy.
A.

INVALIDITY OF THE NO-CITATION

THE NO-CITATION RULE
STATUTE

IS

INCONSISTENT WITH THE JUDICIAL NOTICE

Rules of court are valid "to the extent that they are not inconsistent
with legislative enactments and constitutional provisions."'

A rule in

138. Id.
139. Id. at 89 -oo.

140. Id. But see Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3 d 1155, I16o ( 9 th Cir. 2001) (disagreeing with Anastasoff
as overbroad and upholding the validity of no-citation rules as "an effort to deal with precedent in the
context of a modem legal system, which has evolved considerably since the early days of common
law," and which has only continued to evolve).
141. In re Little's Estate, 72 P. 2d 213, 215 (Ct. App. 1937) (internal citations omitted).
142. Anastasoff v. United States, 235 F-3d 1054, 1055 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
143. See Anastasoff, 223 F.3 d at 9oi ("Modern legal scholars tend to justify the authority of
precedents on equitable or prudential grounds.").
144. In re Richard S., 819 P.2d 843,847 (Cal. i9i).
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conflict with a statute is unconstitutional.'45 The California Evidence
Code permits judicial notice of the records of any state or federal court."46
Court orders, judgments, opinions -including tentative decisionsfindings of fact, and conclusions of law are all eligible for judicial notice
under this legislation." In fact, where a party requests judicial notice of a
court record, gives notice of that request, and furnishes the court with
sufficient information to take judicial notice, the court must take judicial
notice.14
Since appellate decisions are a matter of court record, unpublished
opinions are properly subject to judicial notice. 49 But judicial notice
requires citation to, and asks the court to rely on, court documents
regardless of their publication status.' The no-citation rule, which
prohibits citation to and reliance on unpublished opinions, is at war with
the judicial notice statute. The no-citation rule defeats the purpose of the
judicial notice statute, and in so doing, loses the constitutional war.
i. Notable Developments in the No-Citation Rule's History
The State Bar's Special Committee on Appellate Courts cautioned
the supreme court in 1973 that its proposed no-citation rule had "a
problem" with the judicial notice statute, which "might provide the focus
for a wholesale attack" on its validity.... "There would appear to be a
serious question whether the right to make a request for judicial notice
could be limited by rule of the Supreme Court,"' the report said,
concluding that the rift with "judicial notice must be handled through
legislation."" The committee advising the supreme court, however,
summarily dismissed the State Bar's warning.154

145. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6(d); Hess v. Ford Motor Co., 41 P-3d 46, 57 (Cal. 2002) (asserting the
invalidity of rules that are inconsistent with statutes); Maldonado v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr.
199, 200 (Ct. App. 1984) (same).
146. CAL. EVID. CODE § 45 2(d) (West 2004).
147. See, e.g., Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons, 12 P.3d 720, 755 n.3 (Cal. 2000) (taking judicial

notice of a tentative decision); People v. Woodell, 950 P.2d 85, 89-92 (Cal. 1998) (taking judicial notice
of an appellate opinion); Knodel v. Knodel, 537 P.2d 353, 355 n.3 (Cal. 1975) (taking judicial notice of
a trial court order, despite its omission from the clerk's transcript); Nichols v. Hast, 400 P.2d 753, 754
(Cal. 1965) (deeming court minutes judicially noticeable); People v. Harbolt, 71 Cal. Rptr 459,462 (Ct.
App. 1997) (affirming judicial notice of an appellate opinion); Gen. Ins. Co. v. Mammoth Vista
Owners' Ass'n, 220 Cal. Rptr. 291, 296 (Ct. App. 1985) (granting judicial notice of a prior opinion);
Day v. Sharp, 123 Cal. Rptr 918, 924 (Ct. App. 1975) (confirming the propriety of judicial notice for
court documents).
148. EVID. §H453, 459(a).
149. See id. § 452(d) (authorizing judicial notice of court documents).
150. Id. H§453, 459(a). Judicial notice may also be taken of facts not involving the content of
documents, such as the publication status of an opinion. Id. § 452(g). Here, the discussion is focused on
situations where someone wants to rely on the content of a prior court opinion.
151. JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 21, at 12.

152. Id. at 21.

153. Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
154. Id. at 5.
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The courts have yet to uphold the no-citation rule against a judicial
notice-based, constitutional attack. The closest constitutional assault on
the no-citation rule in California came from Schmier. However, judicial
notice was not the rationale for that case. The Schmier court said the nocitation rule was consistent with Civil Code section 22.2, and thus, was
constitutional."' Schmier's analysis is a straightforward application of the
consistency-with-statute requirement for rules of court. While that
analysis saved the no-citation rule from attack based on Civil Code
section 22.2, it does little to withstand the violence done by the judicial
notice statute. The judicial notice statute says that unpublished
opinions-as court records-can be cited in other cases; the no-citation
rule says they cannot. The position of the two authorities is in direct
conflict, and in conflicts between the rules of court and statutes, the rules
of court must submit."' Nothing in Schmier suggests otherwise.
The supreme court's scarce decisions in the judicial notice
controversy are mixed. In People v. Webster,'7 the prosecutor in a death
penalty case sought judicial notice of an unpublished appellate decision
involving the appellant's codefendants."8 In a short footnote, the
supreme court refused the request as inconsistent with the no-citation
rule.'59 The court made no analysis other than to note the inconsistency.
Three years later, in Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,'" R.J.

Reynolds requested judicial notice of a federal court decision after its
case had been fully briefed.16' Noting defendant's lack of diligence, the
supreme court denied its request as an improper attempt to bypass the
normal briefing process.16 , In seven sentences addressing the issue, the
court reasoned that judicial notice should not be used to skirt appellate
rules, citing Webster as precedent."' As if oblivious to article VI, section
6, the court construed Webster as authority for the proposition that
"judicial notice may not be used to circumvent the prohibition against
citing unpublished opinions."'6 Four years later, the court retreated from
this disturbing conclusion in People v. Hill.'65

155. See Schmier v. Cal. Supreme Court, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 58o, 584-85 (Ct. App.
156. See CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6(d).
157. 814 P.2d 1273 (Cal. i99i).

2000).

158. Id. at 1280 n.4.
159. Id.
i6o. 875 P.2d 73, 77 (Cal. 1994), overruled on other grounds by In re Tobacco Cases II, 163 P-3d
lo6 (Cal. 2007).

161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. (citing Webster, 814 P.2d at 1280 n.4).
165. 952 P.2d 673, 7oo n.9 (Cal. 1998) (taking judicial notice of an unpublished opinion critical of

the same prosecutor as in the case at bar).
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Hill involved another death penalty case, but one that was riddled
with prosecutorial misconduct.'6 The prosecutor's errors were so flagrant
that the defendant's conviction was overturned.'6 After explaining the
need for reversal, the supreme court addressed prosecutorial misconduct
as an institutional concern. As part of its discourse, the supreme court
lambasted the prosecutor for past and present misconduct to emphasize
how her behavior resulted in a miscarriage of justice.'6 Using judicial
notice, the supreme court referenced "a 1987 unpublished
opinion ... affirming a conviction of Roderick Congious" in which the
same prosecutor had been admonished.'6 Having determined that
unpublished opinions are "[r]ecords of ... any court of this state," within
the meaning of the judicial notice statute, the court took judicial notice
over the prosecutor's objection."o "Because we do not cite or rely on that

opinion," the court explained, "judicial notice does not in this
circumstance run afoul of [the no-citation rule]."' Of course, the court
did precisely what it said it was not doing: It relied on the unpublished
opinion to press the woes of prosecutorial misconduct-the very point of
its dissertation.'"7 Moreover, the supreme court inexplicably allowed the
defendant to cite, discuss, and rely on Congious in his brief, 73
contravening the no-citation rule's command that unpublished cases
"must not be cited or relied on by a court or a party in any other
action." 74 The court turned the no-citation rule on its head, while
claiming-with a straight face-that it was fully adhering to it.
Hill was not the first instance in which the supreme court was
unfaithful to the no-citation rule. Nominal fidelity to the no-citation rule
traces back to People v. Turner and Cynthia D. v. Superior Court,where
the supreme court found occasion to cite unpublished decisions. The high
court cited several unpublished cases for persuasion in Turner,'"' and
modeled its decision after one in Cynthia D."' No explanation was given
in either Turner or in Cynthia D. how reliance on unreported cases was

166. Id. at 678-79.
167. Id. at 679.
168. Id. at 699-7oo.
169. Id.; see also People v. Congious, No. Bo2o0979, at 8 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 1987) (unpublished)
("[I]t is disheartening, to say the least, to learn that she takes 'pride' in our admonitions, apparently
because we did not reverse the judgment rendered .. . .").
17o. Hill, 952 P.2d at 7oo n.9 (alteration in original) (quoting CAL. EvIo. CODE § 45 2(d) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
171. Id.
172. See id. at 699-700 (analyzing the harmless error rule with reference to prosecutor's past
conduct, as recorded in Congious).
173. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 163-65, People v. Hill, 952 P.2d 673 (No. S007386).
174. CAL. R. Cr. 8.iis5(a) (emphasis added).
175. People v. Turner, 789 P.2d 887, 9o6 n.17 (Cal. 1990).
176. 85I P.2d 1307, 1314 n.9 (Cal. 1993).
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consistent with the no-citation rule. Despite this history of infidelity, the
supreme court remains wedded to the no-citation rule.
The supreme court has never considered the impact of article VI,
section 6(d) on its analysis of the no-citation rule. Because "an opinion is
not authority for a proposition not therein considered,"'77 no present
supreme court ruling is effective against an article VI, section 6(d) attack
predicated on judicial notice. The court's cursory review of judicial
notice in Webster, R.J. Reynolds, and Hill is thoroughly inadequate. In
each case, the court failed to deliberate over the preemptory aspect of
legislative acts.
In R.J. Reynolds, the court went so far as to place court rules before
statutes. It said the judicial notice statute may not be used to
"circumvent" rules of court.'17 The court got it backwards: "A rule of
court cannot take precedence over a statute."' 79 Statutes outrank rules of
court.'" "If a rule is inconsistent with a statute, the statute controls.",8
Failure to import constitutional law into the fray led the court astray.
Constitutional analysis should have led the supreme court to affirm the
priority of statutes over rules of court. The supreme court, instead, made
the bizarre suggestion that rules of court trump statutes.182
2.
FairnessAccommodations Within Legislation
Legislative enactments mark existential boundaries for rules of
court.183 Those boundaries provide adequate accommodations for policies
behind rules of court. A request for judicial notice must (I) involve
proper subject matter,'8 (2) provide sufficient notice to the adverse
party,'"8 and (3) satisfy otherwise applicable rules of evidence.'m These
conditions are built into the judicial notice statute. The second condition,
requiring sufficient notice, is geared towards fairness to the adverse
party. Had it relied on this accommodation in R.J. Reynolds and Hill, the

177. Ginns v. Savage, 393 P.2d 689,691 n.2 (Cal. 1964).
178. Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 875 P.2d 73, 77 (Cal. 1994), overruled on other
grounds by In re Tobacco Cases II, 163 P.3d lo6 (Cal. 2007).
179. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6(d); Pellegrini v. Weiss, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3 d 387,403 (Ct. App. 2oo8).
18o. CAL. CIV. CODE § 22.1 (West 2007) (stating that statutes and the constitution express the will
of the supreme power); McMahon v. Hamilton, 260 P. 793, 795 (Cal. 1927) (per curiam) ("It is true, of
course, that rules of court are subservient to statutory mandate.").
181. Hess v. Ford Motor Co., 41 P-3 d 46,57 (Cal. 2002).
182. Mangini, 875 P.2d at 77.
183. See CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6(d) (stating that rules of court may not be inconsistent with
statute); Hess, 41 P.3d at 57.
184. See CAL. EVID. CODE H§ 451, 452 (West 2004) (describing the proper subject matter for judicial
notice). Judicially noticeable matters must be notorious or indisputable. See id. A "dying declaration,"
for instance, presumably is an improper subject for judicial notice.
185. Id. §§ 453, 454, 459.
186. See, e.g., N. Beverly Park Homeowners Ass'n v. Bisno, 54 Cal. Rptr. 3d 644, 656 (Ct. App.
2007) (explaining the applicability of the hearsay rule to judicial notice). California's rules of evidence,
of course, are statutory. See, e.g., CAL. EvIo. CODE §§ I, 300 (West 2004).
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supreme court could have reached the same outcome in those cases
without offending constitutional boundaries.
In R.J. Reynolds, the supreme court could have denied the
defendant's request for judicial notice as untimely-in other words,
unfairly prejudicial to the adverse party.'8 By extension, granting judicial
notice in Hill was proper, as all procedural requisites had been satisfied,
and there was no showing of unfair prejudice to the prosecutor."
Reference to the no-citation rule was unnecessary.
Statutory bars on irrelevant and hearsay evidence provide other
accommodations.'8 With these legislative directives, a court may freely
deny irrelevant requests for judicial notice or requests that seek to
introduce hearsay evidence. Thus, if a party to a divorce proceeding
requests judicial notice of the fact that cows moo, his request may be
denied as irrelevant. But neither the relevancy test nor the hearsay bar
does anything to save the no-citation rule. At best, the two restraints lead
to a teaser. Some may urge, for example, that the no-citation rule
necessarily makes unpublished opinions irrelevant in other cases,
allowing for denial of judicial notice. But the import of this claim is that
the no-citation rule is constitutional because it says it is. That argument is
circular.
A rule of court cannot cite itself as authority for violating
constitutional law.'" Otherwise, the no-citation rule could also make, for
instance, the Federal Constitution irrelevant in California cases simply by
prohibiting its citation. Houston v. Williams said even opinionless
judgments can be relevant authority in subsequent cases. 9 ' Unpublished
opinions, a fortiori, are useful beyond themselves.
By failing to rest its analysis on statutory grounds, the supreme
court in Webster, R.J. Reynolds, and Hill veered off course. In Webster
and R.J. Reynolds, the court trespassed outside constitutional terrain,
giving priority to rules of court over statutes.'92 And while the court in
Hill reached the correct destination, it did so by venturing into legal
187. EVID. § 453(a).
188. Compare Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 875 P.2d 73, 77 (Cal. 1994), overruled on
other grounds, In re Tobacco Cases II, 163 P-3 d so6 (Cal. 2007) (seeking judicial notice a few weeks
before oral argument), with Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 173, at 164 n-33 (requesting judicial
notice at the outset of the appeal). By contrast, denial of judicial notice in Webster was improper.
Absent a showing of undue prejudice to the opposing party, judicial notice should have been granted,
as in Hill.
189. See EVID. § 350 (rendering irrelevant evidence inadmissible); id. § 12oo(b) (barring hearsay
evidence); Bisno, 54 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 656 (discussing the interplay of hearsay in judicial notice).
i9o. See Javorek v. Superior Court, 552 P.2d 728, 738-39 (Cal. 1976) (dismissing circular or
"bootstrap reasoning").
191. 13 Cal. 24, 25 (1859) (clarifying how to use opinionless judgments in subsequent cases),
superseded by constitutionalamendment, CAL. CONsT. art. VI, § 14.
192. See Mangini, 875 P.2d at 77 (citing Webster as authority for the proposition that rules of court
may not be circumvented by statutes).
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fiction.'" The statutory requirements of sufficient notice and relevancy
should have adequately placated the supreme court's concerns in those
cases without compromising constitutional limits on rules of court. Most
rules of court are accommodated by and are consistent with statutes. The
no-citation rule is an anomaly. The rule's inability to function even with
statutory accommodations makes it a dead limb on the constitutional
tree, ready to be lopped off.'"
B. THE NO-CITATION RULE IS IN EXCESS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S
JURISDICTION

Writing rules of court is normally the province of the Judicial
Council.'" Created in 1926, the Judicial Council is a body of judges,
lawyers, and legislators who "adopt rules for court administration,
practice and procedure, and perform other functions prescribed by
statute."'9 The Judicial Council created all but two segments of the rules
of court." The exceptions are division five of title eight, the publication
rules, and title nine, the rules of professional conduct, both of which were
adopted directly by the supreme court.'" The supreme court invoked the
publication rules using its constitutional power to designate opinions for
publication under article VI, section 14.
i. The Legal Basis for the No-Citation Rule Is Illogically Derived
The supreme court sees the no-citation rule as a natural extension of
its powers under article VI, section 14." But a closer look should dispel

this mirage. The no-citation rule was admitted on an illogical construction
of article VI, section 14. That provision is a directive to the legislature to
distribute certain court opinions at public expense.2 o' The supreme court
is granted a narrow power to select opinions for that purpose.2o2
Essentially, the supreme court's power under article VI, section 14 is to
force the legislature to publish at least some court decisions. But nothing
193. See People v. Hill, 952 P.2d 673, 700 n.9 (Cal. 1998) (justifying judicial notice of an
unpublished opinion on the ground that the court was not relying on it).
194. This language derives from People v. Greene, 16 P. 197, 199 (Cal. 1887).
195. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6; see also 2 WrnuN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE: COURTS § 181 (5th ed.
2oo8) (noting the Judicial Council's rule-making occupation).
196. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6(d). The amendment creating the Judicial Council, article VI, section
6, was ratified in 1926 but took effect in 1927. People v. Smith, 211 P.2d 561, 563 (Cal. 1949).
197. CAL. R. Cr. 1.3.
198. The Judicial Council apparently cosigned the no-citation rule, People v. Valenzuela, 15o Cal.
Rptr. 314, 321 n-3 (Ct. App.i978) (Jefferson (Bernard), J., dissenting), but current rules give sole
credit to the supreme court. CAL. R. CT. 1.3, 8. ioo.
199. CAL. CONST. art VI, § 14; CAL. R. Cr. 8.ioo.
200. See CAL. R. Cr. 8.1O (citing article VI, section 14 as the basis for the publication rules); see
also Valenzuela, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 322.

201. See CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 14 (instructing the legislature to publish opinions selected by the
supreme court).
202. See id. (authorizing implicitly the supreme court to compel publication of its opinions).
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in article VI, section 14 prohibits the legislature from publishing more. In
fact, the legislature did just that in 1909: By statute, the legislature
commanded publication of all filed decisions.2 " Moreover, the statute
forbade the supreme court from censoring anything.20 4 It said, "All
opinions filed must be printed in full in the law reports."2 o" Yet in 1974,
the supreme court read into its positive right to select opinions a negative
right to prohibit unselected opinions.m6 This assumption of power does
not logically follow.
Article VI, section 14 tells the legislature to publish opinions
selected by the supreme court. Stripping the provision to its logical parts,
article VI, sectionl4 gives this instruction: If designated, publish. From
this, the supreme court has inferred: If not designated, censor. This
inference is a variation of the fallacy known in formal logic as "denying
the antecedent."" If the constitutional provision instead read, "all
monkeys eat bananas," applying the supreme court's logic would yield,
"if you are not a monkey, you do not eat bananas."'2 Deriving a right to
censor from the right to publish at public expense is as illogical as
professing that only monkeys eat bananas.
The no-citation rule is an aberration of constitutional trend,
precedent, and intent. The language of the present publication authority
mirrors its predecessors with little variation. The 1849 Constitution said,
"The legislature shall provide for the speedy publication of.. . such
judicial decisions as it may deem expedient[] .
The 1879
Constitution similarly commanded the legislature to "provide for the
speedy publication of such opinions of the supreme court as it may deem

203. Namely, California law provided:

The reports are to be published under the general supervision of the supreme court,
which may correct clerical errors in the opinion as filed, or authorize the same to be
corrected; but may not in any manner alter the written opinion as to substance, argument
or authoritycited, or omit any portion of the opinion as filed. All opinionsfiled must be
printed in full in the law reports. Proof-sheets of the opinions must be furnished by the
official reporter to the supreme court from time to time as the cases are set up in the
galleys and corrections made.
CAL. POLITICAL CODE § 774, amended by 19o9 Cal. Stat. 1022-23 (repealed 1951) (emphasis added).
204. Id.
2o5. Id.
206. See Gray v. Kay, 120 Cal. Rptr. 915, 918 (Ct. App.1975) (mentioning the inception of the no-

citation rule in 1974).
2o7. See Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690,702-o3 n.20 (2d Cir. 1980) (explaining
the fallacy of denying the antecedent, where a necessary condition is mistaken for a sufficient one).
208. See Agri Processor Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 514 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2oo8) (illustrating the fallacy of
denying the antecedent with the example: "Because it's not cold outside, it's not snowing. It is now
cold outside, therefore it must be snowing" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also LSA T IfThen Statements, TEST SHERPA, http://www.testsherpa.com/1sat/1sat-if-then-statements/ (last visited May
23, 20t1) (illustrating the monkey example).
209. CAL. CONST. Of I849, art. VI, § 12.
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expedient . . . .",2o A notable change came in 1904, when the supreme

court assumed the role of deciding which opinions to publish at public
expense.' Aside from a change in management, in other words, the
publication process remained the same. And it was not until 1974 that
the supreme court barred the century-long practice of citing unpublished
opinions."'
Never during its stewardship of judicial publication did the
legislature claim an inferred right to censor unpublished opinions, unlike
the supreme court. Opinions not officially published remained in the
public domain for discovery.2 13 In fact, when the supreme court's practice
of issuing opinionless judgments interfered with the supply of
publishable decisions, the legislature tried to curtail the practice." 4 The
legislature passed a statute demanding written explanation for court
decisions.1 When the supreme court resisted, the writing requirement
was constitutionally imposed."' And in 1909, the legislature specifically
ordered publication of all court decisions, whether or not the supreme
court designated them.' The trend was to increase circulation of
opinions.
In Houston v. Williams, the supreme court itself encouraged use of
unpublished opinions. The court said attorneys could determine the
principles of law from case records and then cite those cases, along with
their presumed propositions, as precedent.21 8 But today even explicit
principles of law from an unreported decision cannot be used as
precedent. Houston approved citation to implied reasoning, but the nocitation rule disapproved citation to explicit reasoning. To say that a
judgment without comment can be used as precedent, but an unreported
judgment with a written explanation cannot, is irrational. The no-citation
rule flies in the face of the trend, history, and intent of the constitutional
publication authority.
By its explicit terms, article VI, section 14 grants no rulemaking
authority to the supreme court.219 The court does possess inherent
art. VI, § 16.
COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 31, at 9 (mentioning the 19o4 amendment).
Gray v. Kay, i2o Cal. Rptr. 915, 918 (Ct. App. 1975) (referencing adoption of the no-citation

210. CAL. CONST. of 1879,
211.
212.

rule in 1974).
213. See 9 WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE: APPEAL § 489 (5th ed. 2oo8) (describing the early

treatment of unreported cases).
214. See People v. Kelly, 146 P.3 d 547, 550 (Cal. 2oo6) (referencing an 1854 statute that compelled
the supreme court to give written opinions).
215. Houston v. Williams, 13 Cal. 24, 25 (1859), superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL.
CONST. art. VI, § 14.
216. Kelly, 146 P.3d 547,552-53.
217. 1909 Cal. Stat. 1022-23.

218. 13 Cal. at 25 (asserting that attorneys can use opinionless judgments as precedent with careful
study of the records in each case).
219. Cf CAL. CONsT. art. VI, § 6 (reserving explicit rule-making authority for the Judicial Council).
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rulemaking power in the absence of explicit authority, but that power is
limited.22 o If the no-citation rule cannot find basis in the supreme court's
inherent constitutional power either, it stands in excess of the court's
jurisdiction.
2.
The No-CitationRule Is Beyond the Scope of the Supreme
Court's Inherent Powers
Courts possess inherent power to create rules of practice to control
the proceedings before them. This "power arises from necessity where, in
the absence of any previously established procedural rule, rights would
be lost or the court would be unable to function." 2. Unnecessarily
invoking the inherent powers would be crying wolf to the constitution.
The no-citation rule presents no basis for invoking the court's inherent
rule-making power. Previously established procedural rules, such as
judicial notice, are available, and the supreme court can function without
censoring opinions-as it did from 1849 through 1974.222 But even
assuming, arguendo, cause existed for their invocation, "inherent powers
should never be exercised in such a manner as to nullify existing
legislation or frustrate legitimate legislative policy."22 3
For over a century, the supreme court has observed that rules
commissioned by inherent powers are valid "[i]n the absence of any rules
of practice enacted by the legislative authority."" The court has further
explained that it "may make and enforce rules of practice, but a rule
which operates to deprive a party of a statutory right is repugnant to the
statute and therefore to that extent void."1' This limitation predates
article VI, section 6(d)'s explicit requirement that rules of court be
consistent with statutes.226 Rules adopted by courts were subordinate to
statutes even before the adoption of article VI, section 6(d).2 " Therefore,
the no-citation rule's inconsistency with the judicial notice statute cannot
be excused on the technical ground that article VI, section 6(d) is
directed at the Judicial Council rather than at the supreme court.
220.

See

2 WITIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE: COURTS §

limited, inherent powers).
221. Id.
222. See Gray v. Kay,

120

185 (5th ed.

Cal. Rptr. 915, 918 (Ct. App.

1975)

2oo8) (explaining the

judiciary's

(stating the no-citation rule's

effective date in 1974).
223. Ferguson v. Keays, 484 P.2d 70, 73 (Cal. 1971) (determining the court of appeal had inherent
power to waive filing fees in the absence of statute or a Judicial Council rule providing otherwise).
224. People v. Jordan, 4 P. 683, 684 (Cal. 1884).
225. People v. McClellan, 31 Cal. so, 103 (1866) (voiding a rule which prohibited simultaneous
demurrer and answer as inconsistent with statute).
226. See id. (identifying limitation on rules promulgated under inherent powers); see also CAL.
CONsT. art. VI, § 6(d) (voiding rules inconsistent with statutes); Brooks v. Union Trust & Realty Co.,
79 P. 843, 845 (Cal. 1905) (per curiam) (stating that the supreme court rules may "not conflict with any
act of the Legislature").
227. McClellan, 31 Cal. at to3.
228. The supreme court, not the Judicial Council, sustains the no-citation rule. CAL. R. Cr. 1.3; see
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Article VI, section 6(d) merely clarified that the newly formed
Judicial Council was not exempt from the consistency-with-statute
requirement on account of its explicit rulemaking power. Before the
Judicial Council, between 1904 and 1925, explicit constitutional
rulemaking power belonged to the supreme court, and even then the
supreme court was bound by the consistency-with-statute requirement.2 2 9
That explicit grant of power was transferred to the Judicial Council in
1926."o It would be incredible to claim that the supreme court's rulemaking power somehow increased when it lost its explicit constitutional
grant to the Judicial Council.
The supreme court's rulemaking power has a continuous history of
submission to legislative enactments. In People v. McClellan-a case
decided in 1866-the supreme court said it had no power to craft rules
contravening statutes.' In 1905, the court reaffirmed this limitation in
Brooks v. Union Trust & Realty Co., during a period when it enjoyed
explicit constitutional rulemaking power.232 By its own jurisprudence, the
supreme court has thus acknowledged the inherent subordination of
court rules to statutory law.
The court's creation of the no-citation rule was an illegitimate act.
The supreme court, like all courts, has an inherent right to promulgate
rules of procedure."' That power has always been qualified by the
requirement of consistency with all statutory and constitutional
provisions. 3 When the state's constitution was amended in 1926, the
newly created Judicial Council was told its rules would be subject to the
requirement of consistency with statute.235 Article VI, section 6(d)
enshrined the constitutional principle that non-legislative rules are
secondary to legislative enactments."' This clarification for the Judicial
Council in no way translates to increased power for the supreme court.
Admonishment to the Judicial Council to refrain from certain
conduct, which the supreme court had long recognized was improper
(namely, making rules in conflict with statutes), is not consent to the
also supra note 198.
229. See Brooks, 79 P. at 845.
23o. The amendment creating the Judicial Council was ratified in
1927. See People v. Smith, 211 P.2d 561, 563 (Cal. 1949).

1926

and became effective in

231. 31 Cal. at o3.
232. 79 P. 843,845 (Cal. 19o5) (per curiam).
233. See Albermont Petroleum, Ltd. v. Cunningham, 9 Cal. Rptr. 405, 407 (Ct. App.

1960).

234. See People v. Jordan, 4 P. 683, 684 (Cal. 1884) (authorizing court-adopted rules in the absence
of legislation directly on point); McClellan, 31 Cal. at lo3 (disapproving rules inconsistent with statute);
Cunningham,9 Cal. Rptr. at 4o7-o8 (noting the inherent power of courts to make rules not in conflict
with constitutional or legislative provisions).
235. See CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6; 2 WrKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE: COURTS § 390 (5th ed. 2008)
(noting the adoption of what is now article VI, section 6 in 1926).
236. See Trans-Action Commercial Investors, Ltd. v. Jelinek, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 449, 456 (Ct. App.
1997) (confirming the legislature's primary constitutional authority to provide rules of procedure).
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supreme court to engage in that very conduct. Supported by neither the
express nor implied powers of the supreme court, the no-citation rule is
disconnected from the constitution. The supreme court unilaterally
approved the no-citation rule, in excess of its jurisdiction, defying the
long-standing constitutional principle that rules of court may not be
inconsistent with statutes.
C. A RULE

OF CENSORSHIP ELICITS THE IMPRESSION OF JUDGE
NULLIFICATION

Beyond the obligation to be fair in fact, judges are duty-bound to
maintain an appearance of fairness.237 The aypearance of fairness in court
proceedings is an element of due process.23 As a practical matter, public
perception is important to the judiciary because judges "possess no real
power except that which is derived from the respect and confidence of
the people."239 And, "[j]udicial power will not long endure
if public respect and confidence is destroyed because judicial power is
exercised in an unfair manner or appears to be exercised in an unfair
manner."24 o Citation schemes that enable courts to censor their opinions,
like the no-citation rule, lend themselves to an appearance of
impropriety too unpleasant to bear.
i. Basic Problem with Censoring Opinions
When courts censor decisions, by ordering them not to be published
or cited, they invite suspicion of wrongdoing."' Aiding this perception is
the ability of unpublished opinions to cloak grounds for review. The
supreme court intervenes "[w]hen necessary to secure uniformity of
decision or to settle an important question of law."" Preventing disorder
in the legal system, in other words, is motivation for review. An
unpublished opinion purportedly is neither authority nor law.243 Because
it cannot be cited or relied upon, an unpublished opinion is incapable of
creating splits in authority or presenting important questions of law. At

237. Pratt v. Pratt, 74 P. 742, 743-44 (Cal. 1903) (reversing a judgment where the judge seemed
prejudiced against the defendant, and holding that judges must be fair in fact and maintain an
appearance of fairness).
238. See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502 (1972) (reversing the conviction of a white man on the
ground that jury selection, which excluded blacks, created an appearance of unfairness).
239. Wood v. City Civil Serv. Comm'n, I19 Cal. Rptr.
240. Id.

175, 179 (Ct.

App. 1975).

241. E.g., County of Los Angeles v. Kling, 474 U.S. 936, 937 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the former federal no-citation rule as "a rule spawning a body of secret law"); JUDICIAL
COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 21, at 31-32 ("To allow a court to carry on this process in relative secrecy

by not publishing its decisions is to invite arbitrariness. While all judges are presumptively men of
good will, our system of government is predicated upon the notion that its just operation will be
promoted by rules of law, rather than by reliance of the presumption of good will.").
242. CAL. R. Cr. 8-5oo(b)(i).

243. See id. R. 8.1115 (asserting that unpublished opinions are not authority).
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least in theory, unpublished opinions fail to create the sort of chaos that
normally would induce the supreme court to intervene. So much was
implied by then-Associate Supreme Court Justice Joseph Grodin, who in
1984 considered the prospect of publication as a "means of inducing the
supreme court to grant [a] hearing" in a case."
StatisticalAnalysis of Unpublished Opinions
2.
A study commissioned by the supreme court reported that nearly
ninety-two percent of appellate opinions are unpublished.245 The study
showed that between 2001 and 2005, the court of appeal collectively
decided 75,313 cases.24 6 The supreme court reviewed 905 of those cases
and issued opinions in 452 of them.247 Cases in which opinions were not
issued included "grant and hold" reviews, in which the court carries a
case until it resolves a leading case on a decisive issue.4 These cases are
typically disposed of by an order-without briefing, hearing, or an
opinion.249 The study determined that "[o]f the approximately 92 percent
of cases overall that were not certified for publication, only one-tenth of
i percent resulted in opinions issued by the supreme court."25 0 By
contrast, published opinions, which emerged in a tiny fraction of appeals,
accounted for the vast majority of cases decided by the supreme court."'
The numbers speak for themselves.
Whether by design or in practice, unpublished decisions are less
accountable for error.5 If an unscrupulous court wants to defy
controlling precedent, ordering its decision not to be published is a
prudent measure. Odds are less than one-tenth of one percent that the
supreme court subsequently will decide the unpublished case."' This
potential for lawlessness makes the practice of selective publication seem
unfair, even dangerous. What an honorable court may think is a harmless
act, the public may construe as a surreptitious attempt to nullify the law
in order to bring about a certain outcome.

244. Joseph R. Grodin, The Depublication Practice of the California Supreme Court, 72 CALIF. L.
REv. 514, 522 (1984) [hereinafter Grodin, Depublication];see also Joseph R. Grodin, Former Assoc.
Justice, Cal. Supreme Court, Remarks at the Right to Cite Debate at University of California,
Hastings College of the Law (Apr. 14, 2olo) (acknowledging that a published opinion is much more
likely than an unpublished opinion to be reviewed by the supreme court).
245. COMmrlTEE REPORT, supra note 31, at 18.

246. Id. at 16.
247. Id. at s8.
248. Id.; see also CAL. R. Cr. 8.5i2(d) (describing the "grant and hold" mechanism).
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 31, at 18.
Id. at t9.
Id. at 18-19.
See id.
Id.
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3. The No-Citation Rule in Practice
In an effort to improve public confidence in the publication rules,
the supreme court liberalized the standard for publication of court
opinions in 2oo6.254 This liberalization came amidst complaints that
"unpublished opinions may be used to suppress certain types of decisions
or to discourage supreme court review."'"' Among other things, the
current standard states that an opinion "should" be published if it
establishes a new rule of law; modifies, explains, or criticizes a rule of
law; or creates an apparent conflict in the law.5 6 The rules also permit
any member of the public to request publication or depublication of a
court opinion, with oversight by the supreme court.' These purported
safeguards against misuse of the publication rules lack teeth.
On its face, the standard for publication is entirely precatory. The
operative word in the standard is a wishful "should.",,,8 There is nothing
resembling a guarantee that the standard will be enforced. A court bent
on nullifying controlling precedent in a given case has an incentive not to
find grounds for publication -and under the rules, it is not required to do
SO." The aggrieved party's only recourse is to complain to the supreme

court. But the same disincentive that keeps the supreme court away from
unpublished opinions discourages it from ordering an opinion published:
Publishing a questionable opinion increases the need for review.
An appellate court deciding whether to certify its opinion for
publication has a conflict of interest. On the one hand, the court
"should" follow the guidelines for publication.'6 On the other hand, the
court wants to avoid rebuke by a higher court."' So, if the court is not

fully confident in some aspect of its decision -irrespective of any resultoriented intent-it may hesitate to publish. Without publication, after all,
an opinion has an infinitesimal chance of being visited by the supreme
court. 6 2 Refusal to publish an opinion can therefore be interpreted as a
calculated move to discourage supreme court intervention. Since the true
intent of the appellate court is unknown in this process, even a negligent
failure to publish an opinion may be perceived as willful wrongdoing.

254. News Release, Judicial Council of Cal., Supreme Court Amends Rules on Publication of
Court of Appeal Opinions (Dec. 12, 2oo6), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/presscenter/
newsreleases/NR9I-o6.pdf.
255. CoMmrrrEE REPORT, supra note 31, at 4.
256. CAL. R. Cr. 8.1105(c).
257.

Id. R. 8.1120,

258.
259.
260.
261.

Id. R. 8.o105(c).
Id.
Id.
See People v. Netterville, No. 3173174, 2005 WL 32853, at *14 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2005)

8.1125.

(considering the "sting of reversal" on a lower court).
262. See COMMrrTEE REPORT, supra note 31, at 19 (discussing appellate statistics).
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a. The PublicationStandardIs Easily Ignored
Liberalization of the publication standard was meant to reserve the
unpublished opinion procedure for unoriginal, redundant decisions. Yet
a basic online search still yields quite a few inventive decisions that have
63 Sweet
been censored: Gonzales v. Department of Health Care Services,2
6
v. Su erior Court,24 MaiOrano v. ProfessionalCommunity Management,
Inc.," Aida A. v. Superior Court,' People v. Colon,' and De La Rosa v.
City of San Jose.'6 These cases, each of which contains either an internal
disagreement, a disagreement with a sister court, or engages in novel
construction, demonstrate the consequences of a toothless rule.6 While
each case easily passes the hurdle for publication, they remain
unpublished.1 o Their authors do not want them cited."' With the nocitation rule, courts can keep their disagreements relatively private,
attracting less attention from the supreme court, and this ability to
muzzle disagreement may explain the reluctance for publication. The
revised publication standard has the unrealistic expectation that courts
will obey a discretionary rule to their own detriment.
b. The Importance of Unpublished Decisions
Meshed within unpublished opinions are trends in law, practice
points, and insight. Consider, for illustration, Neu v. Superior Court."'
There, petitioner-wife originally sought a writ of mandate, seeking to join
trusts as parties in a marital dissolution action.273 While the wife's petition
was pending, her husband moved for discovery sanctions.274 The court of
appeal subsequently granted a stay in the proceedings below, but once

263. No. B219433, 2oo WL 5377987, at *I-4, *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2010) (exploring the

impact of statutory amendments on a prior supreme court case, distinguishing petitioner's case from
another case, and opting for an entirely different line of reasoning); see also CAL. R. Cr. 8.iio5(c)(i)(5), (8).
264. No. A127884, 2010 WL 1511705, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 201o) (acknowledging split

among courts and taking sides); see also CAL. R. Cr. 8.n105(c)(3}-(6).
265. No. B22o2

7,

2oro WL 3786721, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 20o0) (partially rejecting a

published decision); see also CAL. R. Cr. 8.1 1o5(c)(3), (5).
266. No. B225457, 200 WL 3993719, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2010) (partly disagreeing with a

published case); see also CAL. R. Cr. 8. 1105(c)(3)-(5).
267. No. Fo5 63 3 4, 20I0 WL 612245, at *13 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 201o)

(disagreeing with dissent's

interpretation of controlling precedent); see also CAL. R. Cr. 8.1 105(c)(3), (5), (9).
268. No. Ho33488, 2010 WL 1918658, at *8-17 (Cal. Ct. App. May 13, 2010) (taking the infrequent
step of reviewing an in limine ruling de novo and engaging in statutory construction); see also CAL. R.
Cr. 8. 105 (c)(2)-(4).

269. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Superior Court, No. Ao96423, 2002 WL 120818, at *2 (Cal.
Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2002) (resolving an important issue of public interest).
270. See correlating factors for publication cited supra notes 263-268.
271. CAL. R. Cr. 8.iii5(a).
272. No. Bi63692, 2003 WL 1928397 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2003).
273. Id. at *i.
274. Id.
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that stay was lifted, the trial court granted the husband's renewed motion
for discovery sanctions."'
The wife again petitioned for a writ, this time seeking relief from the
discovery sanctions."' The Neu court sided with petitioner, holding that
the issuance of the stay in the first mandate proceeding relieved the wife
of her obligation to respond to discovery.2 " In a footnote, Neu explicitly
repudiated a thirty-seven-year-old precedent, which had held that the
mere filing of an extraordinary petition, taken in good faith, excused
noncompliance with discovery."5 "We do not go as far today as we went
in Fairfield," said the court, "where we held that the mere filing of a writ
petition. . . relieves a party of an existing obligation to respond to
outstanding discovery requests."" The court even purported to give

advice to members of the bar, remarking, "We close with this caution to
future petitioners: Be specific when you ask for or oppose a stay; when
necessary, seek clarification."'" Having split with a thirty-seven-year-old
precedent, and giving important guidance to practitioners, the Neu court
nonetheless declined to certify its opinion for publication.
The court may have been simply negligent in failing to publish its
decision. But there is room for speculation that the court lacked
confidence in its reasoning. Worse, censorship here may foster a
perception of abuse; namely, masking disagreement with precedent to
reduce the likelihood of scrutiny by the supreme court.' A citation
scheme in which mere negligence can be perceived as an impropriety is
contrary to the duty to maintain an appearance of fairness. Selective
publication, as in Neu, disrupts the appearance of probity in judicial
decisionmaking.
The perception of noncitability as a device for masking error and
nullifying the law is more than speculation. One court was explicitly
accused of judge nullification in 2008.8 In Hild v. Southern California
Edison Co., the underlying action,23 a Southern California Edison
("Edison") employee accidentally blinded a minor.5 4 The plaintiff filed a
personal injury action against Edison. The case went to trial on the issue
of vicarious liability: whether the Edison employee who injured the

275. Id.

276. Id.
277. Id. at *2.
278. See id. at *2 n.8 (disapproving Fairfieldv. Superior Court,54 Cal. Rptr- 721 (Ct. App. 1966)).
279.
280.
281.
282.

Id.

Id. at *2.
See authorities cited supra note 244; see also COMMrITEE REPORT, supra note 31, at 4.

See Hild v. Cal. Supreme Court, No. C o7-5io7 TEH, 2oo8 WL 544469, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Feb.
26, 2oo8) (challenging the court of appeal's refusal to publish its decision in the underlying action as an
attempt to discourage intervention by the supreme court).
283. No. B185778, 2007 WL x8o685o (Cal. Ct. App. June 25, 2007).
284. Hild, 2oo8 WL 544469, at *I (discussing Hild v. S. Cal. Edison Co.).
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plaintiff acted within the scope of her employment.25 Because Edison
had suppressed evidence during litigation, the trial court entered a
spoliation sanction, permitting the jury to infer that the suppressed
evidence was damaging to Edison's case.2" The jury returned a verdict
for the plaintiff, aided by the discovery sanction. The court of appeal
reversed, in an opinion ordered not to be published.*
Plaintiff claimed the opinion should have been published because it
broke with and misapplied existing law and established a new rule of law
to his detriment.8 When the court of appeal refused to budge, plaintiff
sought declaratory relief in federal district court. He complained that the
court of appeal was deliberately using the no-citation rule to torpedo his
chances of review in the California Supreme Court."*
According to the plaintiff, the court of appeal deviated substantially
from controlling precedent, substituted its own inferences for the jury's,
and applied "revolutionary and controversial new legal grounds" to
reach its decision-all without posing a single question to plaintiff's
counsel during oral argument.2 9 1 The court was deliberately using the nocitation rule, plaintiff added, to insulate its dubious decision from
review. 92 This was possible, plaintiff explained, because the no-citation
rule prevents unpublished cases from creating a conflict with published
decisions, thereby depriving litigants of the main ground for supreme
court review: the need to "secure uniformity of decision."2 93 Hild's
federal action was dismissed as moot when the supreme court denied his
then-pending petition for review."
The allegations in Hild are troubling. Plaintiff recited details
portraying a court that acted with stealth to deny him justice." The sole
issue at trial was whether the defendant's employee was acting within the
scope of her employment when she blinded the plaintiff.2" "[T]he
determination whether an employee has acted within the scope of
employment presents a question of fact," except when "the facts are

285. Id.

286. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 3, Hild, 2007 WL 5136904 (No. C 07-5107
TEH).
287. Hild, 2oo8 WL 544469, at *I.

288. Id.
289. First Amended Complaint, supra note 286, at 6-7.
290. Hild, 2oo8 WL 544469, at *i; First Amended Complaint, supra note 286, at 4-5.
291. First Amended Complaint, supra note 286, at 4, 6-7.
292. Hild, 2oo8 WL 544469, at *I, *8; First Amended Complaint, supra note 286, at 4-5.
293. Hild, 2oo8 WL 544469, at *I, *3.

294. Id. at *6-8 (dismissing the case as moot but upholding the no-citation rule based on Schmier);
see also Hild v. Cal. Supreme Court, No. o8-15785, 346 F. App'x 252, 253 (9th Cir. 2oo9) (dismissing
appeal as moot).
295. Hild, 2008 WL 544469, at *1, 8; First Amended Complaint, supra note 286, at 4-5.
296. Hild, 2oo8 WL 544469, at *I.
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undisputed and no conflicting inferences are possible."" A jury verdict
on a disputed question of fact "will not be disturbed on appeal, of course,
if there is any substantial evidence to support it."2 9
The court of appeal in Hild's underlying action conceded that "[t]he
facts in this case are somewhat disputed," but used precedent applicable
where "the facts are undisputed."' With this contradiction, a quick
reference to a decision from a sister court, which it seemed less than
eager to embrace," and having posed no questions to plaintiff's counsel
at oral argument, the court of appeal reversed a jury verdict.3 o' The court
of appeal's subsequent refusal to publish its decision under the
circumstances is difficult to justify.
Whether Joshua Hild was in fact deprived of justice in this inquiry is
not as relevant as whether it appearshe was denied justice, which seems
to be the case." 2 "Poor Joshua!", to borrow Justice Blackmun's famous
line from DeShaney v. Winnebago County of Department of Social
Services," had his judgment vetoed under dubious circumstances. Hild
shows how easily a court's refusal to publish its decision can be
interpreted as result-oriented mischief. One view of Hild is justice done
in a difficult case, by an honorable court. Another view depicts defiance
of the law by judges in order to force a particular result. Because the
latter picture shows scandalous conduct, it is likely to attract more
attention and become the prevailing view among the public.
Hild is both unoriginal and extraordinary. The case is unoriginal
because the party who loses an unreported appeal frequently makes what
one appellate judge calls a "hostile publication request" (that is,
demands publication of the unfavorable decision) to coerce the supreme
court to intervene,3" the idea being that the supreme court will act to
prevent case law from becoming infected with flawed precedent.o"
Because publication requests are processed informally, by letter, '

297. Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 814 P.2d 1341, 1347 (Cal. 1991) (emphasis added) (quoting
Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc., 719 P.2d 676,679 (Cal. 1986)).
298. Barnett v. Keilig, 338 P.2d 477, 478 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
299. Hild v. S. Cal. Edison Co., No. B185778, 2oo7 WL 1806850, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. June 25, 2007)
(quoting Kephart v. Genuity, Inc., 38 Cal. Rptr. 3d 845, 851 (Ct. App. 2oo6)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
300. Id. at *6 n.2.

301. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 286, at 4, 6-7 (describing the court of appeal's
conduct).
302. This is not to say that an illusion of justice is ever a substitute for true justice. Here, priority is
given to perception, because public perception is the subject of discussion.
303. 489 U.S. 189, 213 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
304. Mark Simons, Assoc. Justice, Cal. Court of Appeal, First Appellate Dist., Remarks at the
Right to Cite Debate at University of California, Hastings College of the Law (Apr. 14, 20o0).
305. See Grodin, Depublication,supra note 244, at 514-15 (explaining the supreme court's aversion
to leaving wrongly decided cases on the books).
3o6. CAL. R. Cr. 8.n 2o(a)(2).
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tracking them is difficult. In this regard, Hild is extraordinary-a rare
instance where a hostile publication request is thoroughly documented.
Empirical studies provide further evidence that appellate censorship
is prone to perceptions of impropriety. One study of the liberal supreme
court under Chief Justice Rose Bird "found that three-quarters of its
depublication orders were aimed at opinions with conservative
outcomes."3 " After Republican appointees replaced Chief Justice Bird
and two liberal justices in 1986, "another study found the same
correlation continued, albeit in the opposite direction."3o With statistics
like these, a process advertised as fair on paper seems less appealing in
practice. Ironically, one of the notable opponents of the no-citation rule
in 1973 was then-public-defender Rose Bird.3"
In the court of public opinion, thus, refusal to certify publication
may be seen as an attempt to insulate a decision from scrutiny."o Courts,
under a mandate to maintain an appearance of fairness, must steer clear
of practices that risk injury to their reputation. The practice of
unpublishing or depublishing opinions involves accusations so serious,
with benefits so comparatively minor, that any court engaged in it
recklessly risks harm to its integrity.
D.

AVOIDING CONGESTION WITHOUT CENSORSHIP

Censoring unpublished opinions is a drastic means of reducing court
congestion. California courts can function without a no-citation rule.
What follows is a nonexhaustive list of potential alternatives to this
unnecessary and controversial rule.
i.

More Judges

Withdrawing the no-citation rule will not drive the courts to bedlam.
Repeal of the no-citation rule merely returns California courts to a prior
state of existence. For most of its history, the judiciary of this state
functioned without a no-citation rule and performed fine."' As of 2007,
the federal system has operated without a no-citation rule and is no
closer to collapse.3 12 California courts, too, will survive without
307. Steven B. Katz, Without Precedent, L.A. LAW, Mar. 2001, at 43, 44 (citing Phillip J. Dubois,
The Negative Side of Judicial Decision Making: Depublication as a Tool of Judicial Power and
Administration on State Courts of Last Resort, 33 VILL. L. REV. 69, 511 (1988)) (noting that 76.5% of
opinions ordered depublished by the Bird court had conservative outcomes).
3o8. Id. (citing Gerald F. Uelman, Publicationand Depublication of California Court of Appeal
Opinions: Is the EraserMightier Than the Pencil? 26 Lov. L.A. L. REv. Io7, iol8-20 (1993)).
309. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 21, at 28-30 (opposing nonpublication of criminal
cases).
310. See CommrrrEE REPORT, supra note 31, at 4 (noting concerns that unpublished opinions may be
used to discourage supreme court review); Grodin, Depublication,supra note 244, at 522 (considering
the idea that a published decision may be more likely to induce supreme court review).
311. See CommrrrEE REPORT,supra note 31, at 9.
312. See FED. R. App. P. 32.i(a) (permitting citation to unpublished federal opinions).
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censorship. But even if stress on the court docket intensifies without the
no-citation rule, the state can resort to the antidote it discovered back in
1879: hiring more judges.
2.
More Clerks
A cheaper alternative to recruiting more judges is to increase the
stock of law clerks. Law clerks can be a court's most prized possession.
These quasi-judges do the legwork for the court, from legal research to
opinion drafting.3 13 Judges can manifest their will through their law
clerks, like the President and his3 14 speechwriters. By delegating drafting
tasks to their law clerks, and thus freeing themselves of having to start an
opinion from scratch, judges can conserve substantial judicial time. With
law clerks pedaling alongside judges, the wheels of justice can turn faster,
at a cheaper cost.
3. Shorter Opinions
Judges can also reduce backlog by writing more concise opinions.
While the delegates to the 1879 Constitutional Convention contemplated
reasoned decisions from courts, they hardly expected the behemoth
treatises that frequently issue from appellate courts. Needlessly long
opinions deplete already scarce judicial resources. For example, the
decision in the Marriage Cases,31 5 discussing gay marriage, spans ioo
pages and resembles a law review article. Its federal companion, Perry v.
Schwarzenegger,"' comfortably stretches over seventy pages. By contrast,
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Loving v. Virginia,' discussing
interracial marriage, is less than ten pages long. Both MarriageCases and
Loving were groundbreaking, involved similar subject matter, and
encompassed first-impression issues of vast importance, but the Loving
opinion was up to ten times as efficient.
While MarriageCases might be more thorough than Loving, it is not
necessarily as alluring to litigators.'"8 Practitioners, unlike law school

313. See Rick A. Swanson & Stephen L. Wasby, Good Stewards: Law Clerk Influence in State High
Courts, 29 JusT. Sys. J. 24, 38-39 (2oo8) (emphasizing the importance of law clerks to judicial
decisionmaking); cf Alex Kozinski & Stephen Reinhardt, Please Don't Cite This!: Why We Don't
Allow Citation to Unpublished Dispositions, CAL. LAW.,

June

2000, at 43, 44 (stating that most

unpublished federal memorandum dispositions "are drafted by law clerks with relatively few edits
from the judges").
314. To dispense with the phrase "his or her" (and its permutations), this Note follows the
conventions of the California Evidence Code. CAL. EVID. CODE § 9 (West 2oo4) ("The masculine
gender includes the feminine and neuter.").
315. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P-3d 384 (Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutionalamendment, CAL.
CONsT. art. 1, § 7.5, as recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P-3 d 48 (Cal. 2009).
316. 7o4 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 200).

317. 388 U.S. 5 (1967).
318. Cf Julie A. Oseid, The Power of Brevity: Adopt Lincoln's Habits,6 J. Ass'N LEGAL WRrITING
DIRECTORS 28, 29 (2009) ("Writing is the craft of our profession, and writing with brevity enhances our
persuasiveness.").
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professors, arguably lack the time necessary to sit down and ruminate
over a
0oo-page opinion. To them, an oversized opinion may seem
unattractive. A terser, more concise opinion is better suited to their
schedule. The inefficiency of writing long opinions, thus, probably serves
the busy litigator least, for whom less tends to be more.
Great opinions can be short, as Justice Holmes so regularly
demonstrated. 9 Concision allowed Holmes, on average, to return
judgments within thirty days of oral argument, in less than four pages.3"o
"[T]he art of writing legal decisions," according to Holmes, "is to omit all
but the essentials."2 ' Perhaps one way of guiding courts to write more
efficiently is to subject them to the same page limits they impose on
practitioners."' The constraint of a page limit, in theory, should motivate
judges to budget their words against a looming deadline for their
decision. By simply trimming their opinions, judges can facilitate
reduction of their own dockets. The shorter the opinion, the smaller the
backlog.
E.

No LONGER EXISTS
The basic rationale for the no-citation rule was to mitigate
"unfairness between parties and their counsel who possess unlimited
funds for research and those with very limited budgets.""' This rule came
out in 1974, halting a tradition of citing unpublished decisions dating
THE PREMISE FOR THE

NO-CITATION

RULE

back to 1849."' The supreme court was persuaded by complaints that

unpublished opinions were generally unavailable to members of the bar,

319. See Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 346 n.15 (1981) (per curiam) (noting that Holmes's writing
"characteristically was brief and to the point"). But see Hayes v. Solomon, 597 F.2d 958, 986 n.22 (5th
Cir. 1979) ("I have made this letter longer than usual because I lack the time to make it shorter."
(quoting Blaise Pascal)).
32o. Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as InstitutionalPractice:Dissent, Legal Scholarship,
and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1267, 1290 (2oo); see also Patricia M. Wald,

The Problem with the Courts: Black-Robed Bureaucracy, or Collegiality Under Challenge?,42 MD. L.
REV. 766,782 (1983) ("Abridged memorandum decisions can be addressed primarily to the parties, not
to the public. They can identify the issue for decision, the court's disposition, and the principle basis
for the ruling. They can normally forego an exposition of the facts and procedural history.").
321. Post, supra note 320, at 1291.
322. See CAL. R. Cr. 3.1113(d) (trial court memoranda); id. R. 8.204(c) (briefs in the court of

appeal); id. R. 8.504(d) (briefs in the supreme court); cf Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S. Ct. 705, 706
(2010) (per curiam) ("Courts enforce the requirement of procedural regularity on others, and must
follow those requirements themselves.").
323. People v. Valenzuela, 150 Cal. Rptr. 314, 322 (Ct. App. 1978) (Jefferson (Bernard), J.,
dissenting).
324. See id. at 323 (noting the adoption of the no-citation rule in 1974); see also Houston v.
Williams, 13 Cal. 24, 25 (1859), superseded by constitutionalamendment, CAL. CONsr. art. VI, § 14
(permitting citation to opinionless decisions); Overton v. White, 64 P.2d 758, 759 (Cal. Ct. App. 1937)
(citing an unpublished opinion).
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giving an unfair advantage to attorneys with resources to go on research
expeditions.2
The impetus for the no-citation rule -unavailability of unpublished
opinions to the bar-vanished with the digital era.32 No longer are
attorneys required to ride their horses across town to find advantageous
precedent. Today, all court decisions are a few clicks away.3 " Electronic
databases, court websites, and blogs make legal research a matter of
internet access.
A survey commissioned by the supreme court found that ninety-two
percent of attorneys and fifty-eight percent of appellate judges use
unpublished opinions in their work.' Justice Mark Simons, a judge on
the California Court of Appeal, openly confirms that appellate judges
"are looking at those opinions."3 29 It is "very easy to view these
opinions," he explains, and "because they are easy to view, they are
viewed." 33 o Making "opinions unciteable does not really relieve lawyers
from reviewing them." 331' The original reason for the no-citation rule is
plainly gone, and "[w]hen the reason of a rule ceases, so should the rule

itself." 332
Despite the dissolution of its original premise, the no-citation rule
persists. The premise for the rule has evolved from concern for fairness
325. See Valenzuela, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 321-22; JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 21, at 15; see

also Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F. 3 d 898, 9o (8th Cir.) (touching on modem justifications for the
no-citation rules), vacated as moot on reh'g en banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).
326. See Lawrence J. Fox, Those Unpublished Opinions: An Appropriate Expedience or an
Abdication of Responsibility?, 32 HOFsTRA L. REV. 1215, 1219 (2004) (rejecting the notion that the no-

citation rule is necessary in the digital age because of unequal access to unpublished opinions); id.
("Whatever merit this argument had years ago, it reflects a world that no longer exists.").
327. Id.; see also Barnett, Deflating, supra note 22, at 549 ("With today's methods of computerbased legal research, all such obstacles are bypassed.").
at 41.
329. Simons, supra note 304; see also Sepulveda v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 237 F.R.D. 229, 242, 250
328. COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 3,

(C.D. Cal. 2oo6) (citing unreported decisions), rev'd in part by 275 F. App'x 672 ( 9 th Cir. 2008);
Kalantar v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 402 F. Supp. 2d 130, 139 (D.D.C. 2005) (discussing an

unpublished case); In re Heritage Bond Litig., No. MDL 02-ML-1475 DT, 2004 WL 1638201, at *3-4,
*7-8 (C.D. Cal. July 12, 2004) (citing an unreported case); Sumitomo Corp. v. J.P. Morgan & Co., Inc.,
No. 99 Civ. 878o(JSM), 2000 WL 145747, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2000) (citing an unreported case);
People v. Hill, 952 P.2d 673, 700 n.9 (Cal. 1998) (referencing an unpublished opinion); Cynthia D. v.

Superior Court, 851 P.2d 1307, 1314 n.9 (Cal. 1993) (adapting analysis of an unreported case); Harris v.
Investor's Bus. Daily, Inc., 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d io8, 112-13 (Ct. App. 2oo6) (relying on unreported
opinions).
330. Simons, supra note 304.

331. Fox, supra note 326, at 1221 (pointing out that lawyers necessarily read unpublished opinions

to keep up with legal trends); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 120
reporter's note cmt. c (2ooo) (same); DAVID F. HERR, MANUAL FOR COMPLEx LITIGATION (FOURTH)
§ 21.132 (2oo9 ed. 2009) (citing an unpublished decision); D. KELLY WEISBERG, EMANUEL LAW
OUTLINES: FAMILY LAW 64, 70 (2d ed. 2oo8) (same); THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION

B4.1-4, at iI (Columbia Law Review Ass'n et al. eds., 19th ed. 2010) (noting the frequent practice of
citing unreported decisions).
332. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3510 (West 2oo7) (noting a maxim of jurisprudence).
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to judicial convenience. 33 "At bench and bar meetings, lawyers complain
at length about being" unable to cite to unpublished decisions.' Judges
respond that many unpublished decisions add little or nothing to existing
case law, and absent no-citation rules, court backlog would increase, as
judges would exert additional time writing more detailed opinions. 3 5 As
the Schmier court put it, publication of uncertified decisions would
"clutter overcrowded library shelves and databases with information
utterly useless to anyone other than the actual litigants therein and
complicate the search for meaningful precedent."336
Inconvenience to the courts, case backlog, and other predictions of
doom and gloom are insufficient to justify the no-citation rule. 337 These
same arguments were raised and rejected over a century ago.33' Before
1879, the supreme court produced unpublished decisions in a different
way: by issuing opinionless judgments.' This practice irritated the
legislature to the point that they tried to end it by statute.34 o An offended
supreme court responded, "not every case... justif[ies] the expenditure
of time necessary to write an opinion. Many cases involve no new
principles, and are appealed only for delay. It can serve no purpose of
public good to repeat elementary principles of law which have never
been questioned for centuries." 341 Unconvinced, California voters
approved a constitutional amendment. 342
The delegates to the 1879 Constitutional Convention determined
that requiring written decisions tended to foster "purity and honesty in
the administration of justice."343 This purity and honesty would follow the
increased accountability from opinions that "must come before the
333. See Kozinski & Reinhardt, supra note 313, at 43-44 (explaining increased burdens on courts
but for no-citation rules); see also Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1177 ( 9th Cir. 2001) (Kozinski, J.)
(upholding the prior federal no-citation rule, and noting that opinion writing "is an exacting and
extremely time-consuming task").
334. Kozinski & Reinhardt, supra note 313, at 43.
335. See authorities cited supra note 333.
336. Schmier v. Cal. Supreme Court, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 58o, 587 (Ct. App. 2000).
337. See Chesney v. Byram, tot P.2d iio6, Iio9 (Cal. 1940) (explaining that while legislation may
be convenient, any legislation still must be subordinate to constitutional provisions, further the
purpose of the applicable constitutional provision, and must not attempt to narrow or flout the
provision).
338. People v. Kelly, 146 P. 3d 547, 550-51 (Cal. 2oo6) (discussing the passage of a constitutional
amendment requiring written decisions over the supreme court's objections regarding inefficiency and
institutional rights).
339. See id. at 551 (mentioning the supreme court's practice of deciding cases without written
opinion).
340. See id. at 550 (citing a prior statute requiring the supreme court to provide written opinions
for its decisions).
341. Houston v. Williams, 13 Cal. 24, 26 (1859), superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL.
CONST. art. VI, § 14.

342. See Kelly, 146 P.3d at 551 (noting the passage of a constitutional amendment requiring written
opinions in appeals).
343. Id. at 552.

May 20I1I1]

JUDGE NULLIFICATION

1435

jurists of the country and be subjected to the severest criticism."4 The
electorate heard the arguments, deliberated, and refused to compromise
judicial honesty for convenience. Its solution to court backlog was to hire
more judges.'
Article VI, section 14 enjoined an overwhelmed supreme court from
resorting to opinionless judgments. Nearly a century later, in 1974, the
supreme court recalled the spirit of opinionless decisions. Today, the
high court-and by proxy, the intermediate courts of appeal-issues
reasoned decisions but achieves the effect of opinionless judgments
through the no-citation rule." An opinion that cannot be cited might as
well not exist. Its accountability is on par with opinionless judgments. To
justify the no-citation rule on the basis of efficiency is a perversion of the
writing requirement of Article VI, section 14. If abandoning the nocitation rule is inconvenient, perhaps the state should hire more
appellate judges. The judges who complain most about court backlog
presumably would be first to offer to share their power.
The claim that the no-citation rule avoids wasteful research is
presumptuous, as the study of unpublished decisions continues to be an
important part of legal research.347 Over ninety percent of lawyers
currently use unpublished opinions.348 Bluebook forecasts, "In practice,
you will frequently need to cite a case or slip opinion that has not been or
will not be assigned to a reporter for publication."3 9 As any seasoned
practitioner knows well, good legal research requires examination of
unpublished decisions."o Sometimes the only analysis on a particular
issue is found in an unpublished opinion."' The no-citation rule in these
instances compounds inefficiency, as lawyers have to disregard a case on
point and needlessly search for a different opinion. Their search results
become "like a Soviet era department store, crammed with goods that
can be seen but never attained."" Lawyers have a duty to study trends in

344. Id.
345. See id. at 553 (pointing out the expansion of the supreme court's membership following the
constitutional amendment requiring written opinions in appeals).
346. See CAL. R. Cr. 8.1115 (prohibiting citation to unpublished opinions).
347. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 31, at 41. See generally Barnett, Bark, supra note 22
(suggesting that censorship of opinions is unproductive).
348. CoMMIrrEE REPORT, supra note 31, at 41. See generally Barnett, Bark, supra note 22 (noting
evidence that suggests citability of unpublished opinions yields no significant waste).
349. THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION B4.1-4, at II (Columbia Law Review Ass'n et
al. eds., 19th ed. 200).
350. Barnett, Deflating, supra note 22, at 550 (emphasizing that no serious appellate attorney
would submit a brief on an issue without reviewing both published and unpublished opinions).
351. See, e.g., Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot on reh'g en
banc, 235 F-3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing an unpublished opinion as the only authority on point);
Overton v. White, 64 P.2d 758, 759 (Cal. 1937) (same); see also In re Little's Estate, 72 P.2d 213, 215
(1937) (relying on an unpublished opinion as the most controlling precedent).
352. WILLIAM T. HANGLEY, AM. COLL. TRIAL LAWYERS, OPINIONS HIDDEN, CITATIONS FORBIDDEN: A
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law and to try to anticipate court decisions.353 A rule that tells lawyers to
refrain from relying on unpublished opinions, or to pretend they do not
exist, is an unrealistic effort at thought control.354
Careful examination of unpublished decisions may reveal crucial
developments in the law."' For example, the court in Neu, an
unpublished decision, renounced a thirty-seven-year-old precedent and
gave an admonishment to the bar.356 "We close with this caution to future
petitioners," said the court, "[b]e specific when you ask for or oppose a
stay; when necessary, seek clarification. In the long run, this approach is
both easier and cheaper."' An attorney whose case might come before
this panel must be aware of Neu. Abandonment of the no-citation rule
would merely push the reluctant practitioner to get himself up to speed
with the rest of the bar.
The claim that the no-citation rule still operates to save members of
the bench and bar from expensive, time-consuming, and unfair research
is further belied by the citability of unreported cases from jurisdictions
outside California.35" Surely whatever unfairness, waste, and expense that
attends research of unpublished opinions applies to California and to
foreign cases alike. Yet citation to unpublished opinions of nonCalifornia courts is allowed. California courts cannot credibly claim
citation to their unreported decisions will lead to gloom and doom, but
citation to the unreported decisions of more exotic jurisdictions will not.
"[I]t is difficult to justify a system that permits parties to bring to a
court's attention virtually every written or spoken word in existence
except those contained in the court's own non-precedential opinions."359
This inconsistent practice is evidence that the premise for the no-citation
rule has evolved from fairness to litigants to convenience for judges.
No calamity awaits the judiciary without a no-citation rule. Lawyers
will continue lawyering; judges will continue judging; litigants will
continue litigating; and the Earth will continue spinning. Some say
permitting citation to nonprecedential decisions would force California

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS ON THE PUBLICATION

AND CITATION OF NONBINDING FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OPINION 12 (2002).

353. See Barnett, Deflating, supra note 22, at 543 (urging study of depublished opinions for trends).
354. Id. at 543-44.
355. See, e.g., Neu v. Superior Court, No. B163692, 2003 WL 1928397, at *2 n.8 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr.
24, 2003) (distancing itself from Fairfield v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. Rptr. 721 (Ct. App. 1966), and
purporting to warn the bar).
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. See Harris v. Investor's Bus. Daily, Inc., 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d io8, 114 (Ct. App. 2006) (accepting
citation to unreported federal opinions); Lebrilla v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3 d 25, 31 (Ct.
App. 2004) (approving citation to unpublished decisions of other states).
359. Memorandum from Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory Comm. on Appellate Rules,
to Judge Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure 26 (Dec. 6,
2002), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/AP12-2002.pdf.
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judges and lawyers on an impossible trek.'" Jurists and lawyers,
according to supporters of the no-citation rule, would have to figure out
the full context of nonbinding decisions; lawyers would be tempted to
mischief; immense time would be wasted; and California's judiciary
would come to its knees.36'
But the California Supreme Court dismissed these concerns in
Houston v. Williams when the legislature tried to take away its power to
issue opinionless judgments. There, the court said, "The reports are full
of adjudged cases, in which opinions were never delivered.362 The court
went on to say, "The principles of law settled are to be extractedfrom the
records of the cases in which the decisions are rendered."'6' Houston
invited these supposedly confusing and difficult outcomes. As a matter of
law, therefore, extracting principles of law from case records is no cause
for concern.
Finally, to the extent that the no-citation rule may be said to further
the supreme court's selective publication right, convenience to the court
will not excuse inconsistency with statute. 6 4 The supreme court's
approach to a similar issue in Houston is instructive. At the time Houston
was decided, selective publication was the right of the legislature-the
constitution empowered the legislature to decide which opinions should
be published at public expense.36 5 A rule compelling the supreme court to
state reasons for its decisions unquestionably would have aided the
legislature's publication right, as more opinions would permit more
selection. But when the legislature pressed the supreme court with its
analogous "aid," it received a cold shoulder.36 The supreme court
refused to enforce an aid to the legislature's constitutional publication
power. 6 , When the shoe was on the other foot, the supreme court saw a
rule that facilitated the legislature's constitutional power as an affront to
its autonomy.'6 By parity of reason, the no-citation rule's aid to the
supreme court's publication right should be irrelevant.

360. See Schmier v. Cal. Supreme Court, No. C 09-02740 WHA, 2009 WL 2246205, at *4-5 (N.D.

Cal. July 27, 2009) (upholding the no-citation rule against a First Amendment attack).
361. Id.
362. Houston v. Williams, 13 Cal. 24, 25 (1859), superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL.
CONST. art. VI, § 14.
363. Id. (emphasis added).
364. See Chesney v. Byram, I0 P.2d iio6, iio9 (Cal. 1940) (emphasizing that convenience alone
will not justify violation of constitutional restraints).
365. CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. VI, § 12.
366. Houston, 13 Cal. at 25 (holding a statute requiring written decisions to be unconstitutional).
367. Id.
368. See id. (construing a statute requiring written decisions to be offensive to the court's "dignity
and independence").
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CONCLUSION

Censorship of appellate opinions is a practice at odds with the
state's constitution, history, and sense of justice. Early in its history, the
supreme court managed its growing caseload by simply opting not to
provide written opinions for many of its cases." The procedure was
practical but unpopular with the public.o Opinionless decisions lacked
the accountability that results when a court is compelled to defend its
judgment with reason. Nonetheless, the supreme court was unwilling to
halt the simple process that made its life easier.37 '
Refusing criticism of opinionless judgments, the supreme court said
its workload would become unbearable, and libraries would be filled to
the heavens, were it required to provide written reasons for all its
judgments."' The high court thought written opinions were unnecessary
because attorneys were expected to extract the court's reasoning by
examining the case file.373 California voters rejected the court's arguments,
opting for a more accountable system.374 They imposed on the courts a
constitutional duty to provide opinions for their judgments, while
mitigating the increased burdens of such a duty by hiring more judges.375
Almost a century later, the supreme court gave itself the power to
censor appellate decisions."' With current publication rules, appellate
courts can issue opinions that neither have precedential effect nor may
be cited."' These rules resurrect the spirit of opinionless judgments. An
opinion that cannot be cited is effectively an opinion that does not exist.
Before article VI, section 14, some cases had no opinion to which to
cite.37' Today, the no-citation rule asks us to pretend some cases have no
opinion to which to cite.379 The effect is the same under each system:
Reasons for a judgment are unavailable for direct citation or reliance.
There is constructive censorship under the former system and actual
censorship in the latter. With the no-citation rule, courts do indirectly

369. See People v. Kelly, 146 P-3d 547, 550-51 (Cal. 2oo6) (discussing the supreme court's previous
practice of issuing opinionless judgments).
370. See id. (pointing out the legislature's effort to compel written decisions).
371. See Houston, 13 Cal. at 26 (arguing that a rule requiring written opinions would be wasteful).
372. See id. (speculating on the consequences of a writing requirement).
373. See id. at 25 (stating that principles of law could be extracted from court records).
374. See Kelly, 146 P-3d at 553 (noting the passage of constitutional amendment, justified as
tending to honesty, which required written opinions in appeals).
375. See id. at 552 (discussing the expansion of the supreme court).
376. CAL. R. Cr. 1.3, 8.1too (asserting that the supreme court adopted publication rules on its
own); People v. Valenzuela, 150 Cal. Rptr. 314, 323 (Ct. App. 1978) (Jefferson (Bernard), J.,
dissenting) (determining the effective date of the no-citation rule to be 1974).
377. CAL. R. Cr. 8.1115.

the then-prevailing practice of issuing opinionless
3 78. See Houston, 13 Cal. at 25-26 (mentioning
decisions).
379. See CAL. R. Cr. 8.t115 (barring citation to or reliance on unpublished opinions).
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that which they cannot do directly." The publication rules circumvent
the intent behind the writing requirement of article VI, section 14 and, to
that end, are unconstitutional.
Another constitutional hurdle to the supreme court's publication
rule is the requirement that rules of court be consistent with all
statutes."' The consistency-with-statute requirement predates its explicit
incorporation into the state constitution in 1926, where it admonishes the
Judicial Council.'8' The no-citation rule fails this consistency-with-statute
requirement. The rule is in direct conflict with the judicial notice statute,
which permits citation to any court record.'8' Because the requirement
existed before the Judicial Council, the no-citation rule gets no
exemption on account of being the product of the supreme court. Rules
adopted by courts, rather than by the Judicial Council, remain subject to
the inherent constitutional restraint that they must not conflict with
statutes.
Legal reasons aside, the no-citation rule should be abandoned for its
potentially detrimental effect on public perception of the courts.4 Some
judges point to the efficient qualities of the no-citation rule to justify
their affinity for the rule.8' To them, the no-citation rule is a velvet glove,
worn to ensure delicate handling of controversies. The problem is that
lower courts can use the no-citation rule to discourage supreme court
review."" An opinion ordered not to be published quarantines its flaws to
the case at hand and no further.'"' That quarantine of potential problems
takes away an incentive for a higher court to intervene.
A lower court wishing to avoid scrutiny by the supreme court will be
motivated to keep its opinion unpublished. Regulated looselv by a
standard that "should" apply, decisions on publication are sticky. Thus,
38o. See People v. Dryden, 245 P. 436, 437 (Cal. 1926) ("The law forbids that to be done indirectly
which may not be done directly.").
381. See People v. McClellan, 31 Cal. iot, 1o3 (1866) (deeming void rules that are inconsistent with
statute); see also CAL. CONsT. art. Vt, § 6(d) (same).
382. See generally People v. Smith, 211 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1949) (clarifying that article VI, section 6
became effective in 1927); McClellan, 31 Cal. tot (decided in 1866); 2 WrriaN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE:
COURTS § 390 (5th ed. 2008) (noting the adoption of article VI, section 6 in 1926).
383. Compare CAL. EVID. CODE § 452(d) (West 2004) (permitting judicial notice to any court
record), with CAL. R. Cr. 8.1115 (barring citation to unpublished opinions).
384. See, e.g., Hild v. Cal. Supreme Court, No. C o7-51o7 TEH, 2008 WIL 544469, at *i (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 26, 2008) (accusing the court of appeal of deliberately and improperly refusing to publish its
opinion in order to discourage supreme court review).
385. Kozinski & Reinhardt, supra note 313; see also Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1177 (9th
Cir. 2001); Schmier v. Cal. Supreme Court, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580, 586-87 (Ct. App. 2ooo).
386. See CommnrEE REPORT, supra note 31, at 18-19 (reporting that the vast majority of cases
decided by the supreme court involved published opinions). See generally Grodin, Depublication,
supra note 244 (entertaining the idea that publication may affect the likelihood of supreme court
review).
387. See CAL. R. Cr. 8.1I15 (prohibiting citation of unpublished opinions in other cases).
388. See id. R. 8.ilo5(c) (suggesting, but not compelling, adherence to a standard for publication).
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when the public sees judges wearing velvet gloves, it may question
whether the gloves are really being used for delicate handling or to hide
unclean hands. Judges, whose honor is vital to their efficacy, should
avoid the adverse risk to their reputation that is inherent in production of
unpublished opinions.'8
The public must have confidence in judicial decisions and that
confidence is suppressed by rules of censorship." "Censorship reflects a
society's lack of confidence in itself.""' So too with unpublished opinions.
Every unpublished opinion has an asterisk next to it, casting doubt on
the soundness of its reasoning. In 1879 the voters of this state
disapproved opinionless judgments as a means of efficiency.39 2 Their
intent should not now be circumvented by a rule that makes opinions
seem and be treated as if they were nonexistent.

389. See supra text accompanying notes

241

& 307; see also Hild, 2oo8 WL 544469, at *I.

390. See Wood v. City Civil Serv. Comm'n, I 19 Cal. Rptr. 175, 179 (Ct. App. 1975) (stressing the

importance of public perception to the judiciary's efficacy).
391. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 498 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also JUDICIAL
CommrrrEE REPORT, supra note 31, at 29 ("History has taught us that the lack of information
concerning the operation of any branch of our government brings with it correspondingly less
responsible officials.").
392. People v. Kelly, 146 P-3d 547, 553 (Cal. 2oo6) (noting the passage of the writing requirement
over objections by the supreme court).

